A Theory of Advice Based on Information Search Incentives
This paper investigates whether recourse to a consultant always enhances decision making. Advice given by a consultant changes the manager’s belief about his own decision-making ability. This change in belief alters the manager’s incentives to make a decision. Taking into account this effect, we characterize the contracts that the firm must offer to the manager when a consultant with a given expertise is hired. Surprisingly, we find that the benefit curve of the firm may decrease as the consultant expertise increases, even if there is no consulting fee. Moreover, we show that the value of advice depends on the “good fit” between the informativeness of the consultant and the manager’s incentives to reach the right decision.
|Date of creation:||29 Apr 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
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