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Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Guembel

    (CRM - Centre de Recherche en Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Silvia Rossetto

    (CRM - Centre de Recherche en Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider a cheap talk game with a sender who has a reputational concern for an ability to predict a state of the world correctly, and where receivers may misunderstand the message sent. When communication between the sender and each receiver is private, we identify an equilibrium in which the sender only discloses the least noisy information. Hence, what determines the amount of information revealed is not the absolute noise level of communication, but the extent to which the noise level may vary. The resulting threshold in transmission noise for which information is revealed may differ across receivers, but is unrelated to the quality of the information channel. When information transmission has to be public, a race to the bottom results: the cut-off level for noise of transmitted information now drops to the lowest cut-off level for any receiver in the audience.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Guembel & Silvia Rossetto, 2009. "Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding," Post-Print halshs-00491767, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00491767
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Joanna Franaszek, 2021. "When Competence Hurts: Revelation of Complex Information," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 5-23.
    2. Gáti, Laura & Handlan, Amy, 2025. "Reputation for confidence," Working Paper Series 3141, European Central Bank.
    3. Bond, Philip & Zeng, Yao, 2022. "Silence is safest: Information disclosure when the audience’s preferences are uncertain," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 178-193.
    4. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
    5. Gregory Weitzner, 2024. "Reputational Algorithm Aversion," Papers 2402.15418, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    6. Franaszek, Joanna, . "Kompetencje a rozumienie złożonych informacji," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2021(3).

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