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The benefits of a right to silence for the innocent

Author

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  • Shmuel Leshem

Abstract

This article shows that innocent suspects benefit from exercising their right to silence during criminal proceedings. We present a model in which a criminal suspect can either make a statement or remain silent during police interrogation. At trial, the jury observes informative but imperfect signals about the suspect's guilt and the truthfulness of the suspect's statement. We show that a right to silence benefits innocent suspects by providing them with a safer alternative to speech, as well as by reducing the probability of wrongful conviction for suspects who remain silent with and without a right to silence.

Suggested Citation

  • Shmuel Leshem, 2010. "The benefits of a right to silence for the innocent," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 398-416, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:2:p:398-416
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00105.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Severinov, Sergei, 2015. "Legal Advice and Evidence with Bayesian and non-Bayesian Adjudicators," Microeconomics.ca working papers sergei_severinov-2015-24, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 31 Dec 2015.
    2. Konstantinos Ioannidis & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2022. "Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 659-705.
    3. Mialon, Hugo M. & Mialon, Sue H. & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2012. "Torture in counterterrorism: Agency incentives and slippery slopes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 33-41.
    4. Lundberg, Alexander & Mungan, Murat, 2022. "The effect of evidentiary rules on conviction rates," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 563-576.
    5. repec:ema:worpap:2021-02_v2 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2017. "Disclosure and Legal Advice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 188-225, May.

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