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The Political Economy Of Food Standard Determination: International Evidence From Maximum Residue Limits

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  • Li, Yuan
  • Xiong, Bo
  • Beghin, John C.

Abstract

Food safety standards have proliferated as multilateral and bilateral trade agreements constrain traditional barriers to agricultural trade. Stringent food standards can be driven by rising consumer and public concern about food safety and other social objectives, or by the lobbying efforts from domestic industries in agriculture. We investigate the economic and political determinants of the maximum residue limits (MRLs) on pesticides and veterinary drugs. Using a political economy framework and econometric investigation, we find that nations with higher income and larger population adopt stricter MRLs. We also find that countries set more stringent MRLs in their more competitive sectors. Moreover, we show that MRLs and import tariffs are policy substitutes for policy makers. Finally, we find that countries with higher regulatory quality set tougher food standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Yuan & Xiong, Bo & Beghin, John C., 2013. "The Political Economy Of Food Standard Determination: International Evidence From Maximum Residue Limits," Staff General Research Papers Archive 36181, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:36181
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lota Dabio Tamini & Dupuis Raymond & Maurice Doyon, 2014. "Commerce international des produits alimentaires - Capacité d'application de la réciprocité des normes (innocuité, environnement et social) et leviers à la disposition des gouvernements," CIRANO Project Reports 2014rp-11, CIRANO.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; NTMs; Non-tariff measures; MRL; endogenous; food safety; food trade; maximum residue limits;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade
    • Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy

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