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Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination

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  • Rausser, Gordon C.
  • Roland, Gerard

Abstract

This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Rausser, Gordon C. & Roland, Gerard, 2009. "Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 50294, World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:wbadwp:50294
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.50294
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Colin Poulton, 2014. "Democratisation and the Political Incentives for Agricultural Policy in Africa," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 32(s2), pages 101-122, September.

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    Keywords

    Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade;

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