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Protests and Beliefs in Social Coordination in Africa

Author

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  • Marc Sangnier

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

  • Yanos Zylberberg

    (CREI - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional - Universitat Pompeu Fabra [Barcelona])

Abstract

Leaders' misbehaviors may durably undermine the credibility of the state. Using individual level survey in the aftermath of geo-localized social protests in Africa, we find that trust in monitoring institutions and beliefs in social coordination strongly evolve after riots, together with trust in leaders. As no signs of social unrest can be recorded before, the social conflict can be interpreted as a sudden signal sent on a leader's action from which citizens extract information on the country's institutions. Our interpretation is the following. Agents lend their taxes to a leader with imperfect information on the leader's type and the underlying capacity of institutions to monitor her. A misbehavior is then interpreted as a failure of institutions to secure taxes given by citizens and makes agents (i) reluctant to contribute to the state effort, (ii) skeptical about the contributions of others.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Sangnier & Yanos Zylberberg, 2013. "Protests and Beliefs in Social Coordination in Africa," Working Papers halshs-00822377, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00822377
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00822377
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    trust; norms of cooperation; social conflicts; institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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