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Legacies of violence: trust and market development

  • Alessandra Cassar

    ()

  • Pauline Grosjean

    ()

  • Sam Whitt

    ()

We study the effect of individual exposure to civil conflict on trust and preferences for market participation. We conducted behavioral experiments and surveys among 426 randomly selected individuals more than a decade after the end of the Tajik civil war. We find that exposure to violence undermines trust within localities, decreases the willingness to engage in impersonal exchange, and reinforces kinship-based norms of morality. The effect is strongest where infighting was most severe and where political polarization is high. Robustness of the results to the use of pre-war controls, village fixed effects, and alternative samples suggest that selection into victimization is unlikely to explain the results. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10887-013-9091-3
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economic Growth.

Volume (Year): 18 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 285-318

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jecgro:v:18:y:2013:i:3:p:285-318
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102931

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