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Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European countries

  • Pauline Grosjean

    (School of Economics, Australian School of Business, the University of New South Wales)

This paper uses new micro-level evidence from a nationally representative survey of 39,500 individuals in 35 countries to shed light on how individual experiences of conflict shape political and social preferences. The investigation covers World War II and recent civil conflict. Overwhelmingly, the results point to the negative and enduring legacy of war-related violence on political trust and perceived effectiveness of national institutions, although the effects are heterogeneous across different types (external vs. internal) and outcomes (victory vs. defeat) of conflict. Conflict spurs collective action, but of a dark nature, one associated with further erosion of social and political trust.

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File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2013-29.pdf
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Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2013-29.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2013-29
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  1. Timothy J. Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "State Capacity, Conflict and Development," NBER Working Papers 15088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Alessandra Cassar & Pauline Grosjean & Sam Whitt, 2013. "Legacies of violence: trust and market development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 285-318, September.
  3. Alberto Alesina & Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007. "Goodbye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1507-1528, September.
  4. Daron Acemoglu, 2005. "Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States," NBER Working Papers 11275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  6. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2007. "Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States," Working Papers 0705, CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre, revised 2007.
  7. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2009. "Persistence of Civil Wars," EIEF Working Papers Series 0910, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Sep 2009.
  8. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The origins of state capacity: property rights, taxation and politics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 33768, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  9. Pauline Grosjean & Claudia Senik, 2011. "Democracy, Market Liberalization and Political Preferences," Post-Print halshs-00944983, HAL.
  10. Marcel Fafchamps, 2006. "Development and social capital," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(7), pages 1180-1198.
  11. Shanker Satyanath & Nico Voigtländer & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2013. "Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33," Working Papers 703, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  12. Guido Tabellini, 2010. "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 677-716, 06.
  13. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
  14. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-1288.
  15. Maarten J. Voors & Eleonora E. M. Nillesen & Philip Verwimp & Erwin H. Bulte & Robert Lensink & Daan P. Van Soest, 2012. "Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field Experiment in Burundi," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 941-64, April.
  16. Guido Tabellini, 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2236, CESifo Group Munich.
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