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Gender Quota inside the Boardroom: Female Directors as New Key Players?

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  • Antoine Rebérioux

    (LADYSS - Laboratoire dynamiques sociales et recomposition des espaces - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Gwenaël Roudaut

    (X - École polytechnique)

Abstract

This paper examines whether women's situation within French boards has improved following the adoption of a board-level gender quota in 2011. To do so, we focus on the individual role of female directors as proxied by their fees. Our sample includes the listed companies belonging to the SBF120 index over the 2006-2014 period. We first show that the quota has succeeded in opening the doors of boardrooms to new, unseasoned female directors (not present on the director labor market before the regulation). These unseasoned female directors have distinctive characteristics (in terms of independence, experience, age, nationality, etc.) as compared to other board members. More importantly, we show that women, whether unseasoned or seasoned, experience an inner glass ceiling, with "positional" gender segregation within French boards. In particular, companies have failed so far to open the access of the most important board committees (namely monitoring committees: audit, compensation and nomination) to women. It results in a within-firm gender fees gap of 5%. Overall, the quota has rather amplified this segregation process, with an increase in the average within-firm gender fees gap.

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  • Antoine Rebérioux & Gwenaël Roudaut, 2016. "Gender Quota inside the Boardroom: Female Directors as New Key Players?," Working Papers hal-01297884, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01297884
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-polytechnique.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01297884
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferreira, Daniel & Ginglinger, Edith & Laguna, Marie-Aude & Skalli, Yasmine, 2017. "Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching," CEPR Discussion Papers 12117, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. repec:eee:jbfina:v:88:y:2018:i:c:p:267-291 is not listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Director fees; Gender quota; Segregation; Board; Committees;

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