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Sovereign Debt Crises

Sovereign debt crises have been recurrent events over the past two centuries. In recent years, the timing of sovereign crises has coincided or has directly followed banking crises. The link between sovereigns and banks tightened as the contingent liability that the banking sector represents for the sovereign grew, as financial "safety nets" became more common. This chapter analyzes the transmission channels between sovereigns and banks, with a focus on the effect of sovereign distress on bank solvency and financing. It then highlights the notable cost to the real economy of the close connection between sovereigns and banks. Breaking the "feedback loop" between these two sectors should be an important policy priority.

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Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series International Finance Discussion Papers with number 1104.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 21 May 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:1104
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Web page: http://www.federalreserve.gov/

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  11. Alexander Popov & Neeltje van Horen, 2013. "The impact of sovereign debt exposure on bank lending: Evidence from the European debt crisis," DNB Working Papers 382, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  12. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973, April.
  13. Gande, Amar & Parsley, David C., 2005. "News spillovers in the sovereign debt market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 691-734, March.
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  17. Eduardo Borensztein & Patricio Valenzuela & Kevin Cowan, 2007. "Sovereign Ceilings "Lite"? T+L3712he Impact of Sovereign Ratingson Corporate Ratings in Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Papers 07/75, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2010. "Are banks too big to fail or too big to save ? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5360, The World Bank.
  19. Luis Brandao-Marques & Ricardo Correa & Horacio Sapriza, 2013. "International evidence on government support and risk taking in the banking sector," International Finance Discussion Papers 1086, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  20. Marcello Bofondi & Luisa Carpinelli & Enrico Sette, 2013. "Credit supply during a sovereign debt crisis," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 909, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  21. Bilson, Christopher M. & Brailsford, Timothy J. & Hooper, Vincent C., 2002. "The explanatory power of political risk in emerging markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-27.
  22. Bolton, Patrick & Jeanne, Olivier, 2011. "Sovereign Default Risk and Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 8358, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Furceri, Davide & Zdzienicka, Aleksandra, 2012. "How costly are debt crises?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 726-742.
  24. Kaminsky, Graciela & Schmukler, Sergio, 2001. "Emerging markets instability: do sovereign ratings affect country risk and stock returns?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2678, The World Bank.
  25. Viral V. Acharya & Sascha Steffen, 2013. "The "Greatest" Carry Trade Ever? Understanding Eurozone Bank Risks," NBER Working Papers 19039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Acharya, Viral V & Steffen, Sascha, 2013. "The "Greatest" Carry Trade Ever? Understanding Eurozone Bank Risks," CEPR Discussion Papers 9432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Berger, Allen N. & Bouwman, Christa H.S., 2013. "How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 146-176.
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