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Monitoring and Analysis of Contingent Budget Liabilities to Financial System

Author

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  • Igor V. Belyakov

    (Economic Expert Group, Moscow 109012, Russia; Financial Research Institute, Moscow 127006, Russia)

Abstract

The last global financial crisis has demonstrated that when contingent budget liabilities risks materialize, the resulted budget losses can be huge even in advanced economies. Thus, the importance of the topic raised due to the need to mitigate these risks. On the other hand, monitoring and analysis of contingent budget liabilities are necessary for reliability of budget forecast, which is the basis for the future budget policy. The recent surveys of the OECD (2014) and the IMF (2016) have revealed that monitoring and analysis of the budget risks of contingent liabilities generally are not well-organized in most of countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to formulate several verified recommendations and point out some of the best practices in this field. These include regular and comprehensive reporting on budget risks, application of stress-testing and probability approach, and also calculation of quantitative indicators that measure implicit budget liabilities. As an illustration, two of such indicators, based on the Russian data for 2012–2016, are calculated and considered in the article.

Suggested Citation

  • Igor V. Belyakov, 2017. "Monitoring and Analysis of Contingent Budget Liabilities to Financial System," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 4, pages 71-84, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:fru:finjrn:170406:p:71-84
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Antonina S. Kovalevskaya & Svetlana I. Nikulina, 2018. "Government Guarantees as an Instrument for Investment Risk Allocation," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 5, pages 23-33, October.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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