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The Impact of R&D Cooperations on Drug Variety Offered on the Market. Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry

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  • Tannista Banerjee
  • Ralph Siebert

Abstract

Our study puts special attention to the fact that R&D cooperations in the pharmaceutical industry are formed at different stages throughout the drug development process. We study if the timing to engage in R&D cooperations in the pharmaceutical industry has different impacts on the technology and product markets. Using a comprehensive dataset on the pharmaceutical industry, and estimating a heterogeneous treatment effects model (Heckman et al., 2006) our results show that R&D cooperations formed at the early stages increase the number of R&D projects and the number of drugs launched on the product market. Most interestingly, late stage R&D cooperations significantly reduce the number of drugs launched on the market, even though they increased firms’ activity in the technology markets. This result highlights the fact that firms re-optimize their drug development portfolio to avoid wasteful duplication and cannibalizing the sales of the jointly developed drug in R&D cooperations. Our study show that firms cooperating in late stage collaborations re-optimize their individual drug development portfolios, which significantly reduces the number of drugs offered on the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Tannista Banerjee & Ralph Siebert, 2014. "The Impact of R&D Cooperations on Drug Variety Offered on the Market. Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 4567, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4567
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    Cited by:

    1. Vicar S. Valencia, 2016. "The Impact of R&D Alliance on the Survival of Newly Listed High Tech Firms," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 6(2), pages 197-210, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    drug development; dynamics; co-development; pharmaceutical industry; product variety; product market competition; Research and Development cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis

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