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Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment

  • Thomas Aronsson
  • Erkki Koskela
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    This paper concerns optimal redistributive income taxation and provision of a public input good in a two-type model with a minimum wage policy implemented for the low-ability type, where firms may use some of their resources for outsourcing by locating part of the production process abroad. Our results show that the incentive to relax the self-selection constraint and the incentive to increase employment among the low-skilled reinforce each other in terms of marginal income taxation. In addition, the appearance of equilibrium unemployment also provides an incentive for the government to directly tax outsourcing. Without a direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, the government may reduce the amount of resources spent on outsourcing by increased provision of the public input good, which is desirable in the sense that reduced outsourcing contributes to less wage inequality and increased employment.

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    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2008/wp-cesifo-2008-12/cesifo1_wp2481.pdf
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    Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2481.

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    Date of creation: 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2481
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    1. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff, 1999. "A Minimum Wage can be Welfare-Improving and Employment-Enhancing," Working Papers 980, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    2. Geishecker, Ingo & Görg, Holger, 2007. "Winners and losers: A Micro-level Analysis of International Outsourcing and Wages," CEPR Discussion Papers 6484, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Koskela, Erkki & Schöb, Ronnie, 2001. "Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of Unemployment," Discussion Papers 758, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    4. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
    5. Christian Keuschnigg & Evelyn Ribi, 2007. "Outsourcing, Unemployment and Welfare Policy," Working Papers 0720, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    6. Jonathan Haskel & Matthew J. Slaughter, 1999. "Trade, Technology and U.K. Wage Inequality," NBER Working Papers 6978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 1997. "Wage bargaining, Labor-tax progression, and welfare," Munich Reprints in Economics 20302, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    8. Thomas Aronsson & Erkki Koskela, 2008. "Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A Note," CESifo Working Paper Series 2269, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Mary Amiti & Shang-Jin Wei, 2004. "Fear of Service Outsourcing; Is It Justified?," IMF Working Papers 04/186, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Marceau, Nicolas & Boadway, Robin, 1994. " Minimum Wage Legislation and Unemployment Insurance as Instruments for Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(1), pages 67-81.
    11. Rebecca Riley & Dr Garry Young, 2003. "Skill Heterogeneity and Equilibrium Unemployment," NIESR Discussion Papers 222, National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
    12. Stefan Boeters & Kerstin Schneider, 1999. "Government versus Union. The Structure of Optimal Taxation in a Unionized Labor Market," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(2), pages 174-, June.
    13. Stefanova Boyka M, 2006. "The Political Economy of Outsourcing in the European Union and the East-European Enlargement," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-45, August.
    14. Thomas Aronsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2004. "Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(4), pages 661-675, December.
    15. Robert C. Feenstra & Gordon H. Hanson, 1999. "The Impact of Outsourcing and High-Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates For the United States, 1979–1990," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 907-940.
    16. Alexander Hijzen, 2007. "International Outsourcing, Technological Change, and Wage Inequality," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 188-205, 02.
    17. Aronsson, Thomas & Koskela, Erkki, 2008. "Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A Note," Umeå Economic Studies 737, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    18. Hartmut Egger & Peter Egger, . "International Outsourcing and the Productivity of Low-skilled Labour in the EU," WIFO Working Papers 152, WIFO.
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