Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A Note
This paper addresses outsourcing in the two-type optimal income tax model. If the government is able to control outsourcing via a direct tax instrument, outsourcing will not affect the marginal income tax structure. In the absence of a direct tax instrument, and under the plausible assumption that higher outsourcing increases the wage differential, the government will implement a lower marginal income tax rate for the low-ability type and a higher marginal income tax rate for the high-ability type than it would otherwise have done.
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