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Government versus Union. The Structure of Optimal Taxation in a Unionized Labor Market

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  • Stefan Boeters
  • Kerstin Schneider

Abstract

This paper analyses optimal taxation with an imperfect labor market. Unemployment results from the market power of a monopoly union that determines the wage unilaterally. The government provides a public good and raises revenue by taxing rent, labor and capital income. Labor is immobile while capital is internationally traded. This paper focuses on the interaction between government and union. The Nash equilibrium is compared with the alternative of the Stackelberg leadership of the government. While the structure of the game has only a minor impact on the optimal choice of the tax on capital, the tax on labor depends critically on the structure of the interaction. Employment is lower when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Boeters & Kerstin Schneider, 1999. "Government versus Union. The Structure of Optimal Taxation in a Unionized Labor Market," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(2), pages 174-174, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(199906)56:2_174:gvu_2.0.tx_2-k
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Wikström, Magnus, 2011. "Optimal Tax Progression: Does it Matter if Wage Bargaining is Centralized or Decentralized?," Umeå Economic Studies 829, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    2. Pauser, Johannes, 2013. "Capital mobility, imperfect labour markets, and the provision of public goods," IAB-Discussion Paper 201309, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    3. Wolfram Richter & Kerstin Schneider, 2001. "Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(3), pages 245-262, May.
    4. Wolfgang Eggert & Laszlo Goerke, "undated". "Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    5. Wehke, Sven, 2009. "Union wages, hours of work and the effectiveness of partial coordination agreements," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 89-96, January.
    6. Boeters, Stefan, 2002. "Tax Progressivity and the Trade Union's Fallback-Option," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-15, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    7. Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schöb, 2002. "Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of Unemployment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(3), pages 387-404, July.
    8. Ronnie Schöb, 2003. "The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 946, CESifo.
    9. Aronsson, Thomas & Koskela, Erkki, 2008. "Optimal Redistributive Taxation and Provision of Public Input Goods in an Economy with Outsourcing and Unemployment," Umeå Economic Studies 759, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    10. Aronsson, Thomas & Wehke, Sven, 2008. "Public goods, unemployment and policy coordination," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 285-298, May.
    11. Sven Wehke, 2007. "Fighting Tax Competition in the Presence of Unemployment: Complete versus Partial Tax Coordination," FEMM Working Papers 07010, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    12. Stefan Boeters, 2004. "Green Tax Reform and Employment: The Interaction of Profit and Factor Taxes," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 60(2), pages 222-239, August.

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