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Reputation, risk-taking and macroprudential policy

Author

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  • Aikman, David

    () (Bank of England)

  • Nelson, Benjamin

    () (Bank of England)

  • Tanaka, Misa

    () (Bank of England)

Abstract

This paper examines the role of macroprudential capital requirements in preventing inefficient credit booms in a model with reputational externalities. Unprofitable banks have strong incentives to invest in risky assets and generate inefficient credit booms when macroeconomic fundamentals are good in order to signal high ability. We show that across-the-system countercyclical capital requirements that deter credit booms are constrained optimal when fundamentals are within an intermediate range. We also show that when fundamentals are deteriorating, a public announcement of that fact can itself play a powerful role in preventing inefficient credit booms, providing an additional channel through which macroprudential policies can improve outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Aikman, David & Nelson, Benjamin & Tanaka, Misa, 2012. "Reputation, risk-taking and macroprudential policy," Bank of England working papers 462, Bank of England.
  • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:0462
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Aymanns & J. Doyne Farmer, 2014. "The dynamics of the leverage cycle," Papers 1407.5305, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2014.
    2. Mehmet Fatih Ekinci & Gazi Kabas & Enes Sunel, 2013. "End-Point Bias in Trend-Cycle Decompositions : An Application to the Real Exchange Rates of Turkey," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 13(3), pages 61-71.
    3. Lukas Pfeifer & Libor Holub & Zdenek Pikhart & Martin Hodula, 2016. "The Role of the Leverage Ratio in Capital Regulation of the Banking Sector," Occasional Publications - Chapters in Edited Volumes,in: CNB Financial Stability Report 2015/2016, chapter 0, pages 137-148 Czech National Bank, Research Department.
    4. Aymanns, Christoph & Caccioli, Fabio & Farmer, J. Doyne & Tan, Vincent W.C., 2016. "Taming the Basel leverage cycle," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 263-277.
    5. Aikman, David & Haldane, Andrew & Hinterschweiger, Marc & Kapadia, Sujit, 2018. "Rethinking financial stability," Bank of England working papers 712, Bank of England.
    6. Aymanns, Christoph & Caccioli, Fabio & Farmer, J. Doyne & Tan, Vincent W.C., 2015. "Taming the Basel leverage cycle," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65089, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Sivec, Vasja & Volk, Matjaz & Chen, Yi-An, 2018. "Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Capital Buffer Release," MPRA Paper 84323, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Jan 2018.
    8. Giese, Julia & Nelson, Benjamin & Tanaka, Misa & Tarashev, Nikola, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 21: How could macroprudential policy affect financial system resilience and credit? Lessons from the literature," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 21, Bank of England.
    9. Aymanns, Christoph & Farmer, J. Doyne, 2015. "The dynamics of the leverage cycle," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 155-179.
    10. Christoph Aymanns & Fabio Caccioli & J. Doyne Farmer & Vincent W. C. Tan, 2015. "Taming the Basel Leverage Cycle," Papers 1507.04136, arXiv.org.
    11. repec:fau:fauart:v:67:y:2017:i:4:p:277-299 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Macroprudential policy; credit booms; bank capital regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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