Field Experiments on Anchoring of Economic Valuations
A pillar of behavioral research is the view that preferences are constructed during the value elicitation process, but it is unclear whether, and to what extent, such biases influence real market equilibria. This paper examines the “anchoring” phenomenon in the field. The first experiment produces evidence that inexperienced consumers can be anchored in the value elicitation process, yet there is little evidence that experienced agents are influenced by anchors. The second experiment finds that anchors have only transient effects on prices and quantities traded: aggregate market outcomes converge to the intersection of supply and demand after a few market periods.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/CBPPHome/DepartmentsandMajors/Economics.aspx|
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