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Mikhail Drugov

Personal Details

First Name:Mikhail
Middle Name:
Last Name:Drugov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pdr49
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/view/drugov/
Terminal Degree:2006 Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

New Economic School (NES)

Moscow, Russia
http://www.nes.ru/
RePEc:edi:nerasru (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Mikhail Drugov & Margaret Meyer & Marc Moeller, 2022. "Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard," Working Papers w0290, New Economic School (NES).
  2. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry & Zhang, Jun, 2022. "Tournaments with Reserve Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 17107, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Levent Celik & Mikhail Drugov, 2021. "Score Disclosure," Working Papers w0285, New Economic School (NES).
  4. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers w0278, New Economic School (NES).
  5. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Working Papers w0256, New Economic School (NES).
  6. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, New Economic School (NES).
  7. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, New Economic School (NES).
  8. Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, New Economic School (NES).
  9. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Optimal Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12368, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Dmitry Ryvkin & Mikhail Drugov, 2017. "Tournaments," Working Papers wp2017_03_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
  12. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2016. "Biased contests for symmetric players," MPRA Paper 75378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Drugov, Mikhail, 2015. "Optimal Patronage," CEPR Discussion Papers 10343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Drugov, Mikhail & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2014. "Financing experimentation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68219, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  15. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Mikhail Drugov & Roberto Hernán-González & Praveen Kujal & Marta Troya Martinez, 2013. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment," Working Papers 13-32, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  17. Drugov, Mikhail & Troya Martinez, Marta, 2012. "Vague Lies: How to Advise Consumers When They Complain," CEPR Discussion Papers 9201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2011. "Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment," Working Papers wp2011_01_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
  19. Drugov, Mikhail, 2011. "Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1102, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  20. Drugov, Mikhail & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2008. "Learning and Microlending," CEPR Discussion Papers 7011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Mikhail Drugov, 2007. "Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption," Economics Series Working Papers 369, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  22. Mikhail Drugov, 2006. "Information and Delay in an Agency Model," Economics Series Working Papers 298, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Mikhail Drugov, 2021. "Bargaining with informational and payoff externalities," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 398-419, May.
  2. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
  3. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
  4. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  5. Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya‐Martinez, 2019. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 298-315, April.
  6. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
  7. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
  8. Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2014. "Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 78-99, March.
  9. Drugov, Mikhail, 2010. "Competition in bureaucracy and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 107-114, July.
  10. Mikhail Drugov, 2010. "Information and delay in an agency model," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 598-615, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers w0278, New Economic School (NES).

    Cited by:

    1. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 005, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    2. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 40-50.

  2. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Working Papers w0256, New Economic School (NES).

    Cited by:

    1. Hanming Fang & Ming Li & Zenan Wu, 2022. "Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China," NBER Working Papers 30780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    3. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 005, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    4. Zhou, Jidong, 2020. "Improved Information in Search Markets," MPRA Paper 100509, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Zhu, Weichao & Wang, Lu & Lang, Youze, 2022. "The costs and benefits of tournament in a frictional labor market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    6. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    7. Morgan, John & Tumlinson, Justin & Várdy, Felix, 2022. "The limits of meritocracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

  3. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, New Economic School (NES).

    Cited by:

    1. March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2019. "The Perks of Being in the Smaller Team: Incentives in Overlapping Contests," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203509, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Information Disclosure in Contests with Endogenous Entry: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 5128-5150, November.

  4. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, New Economic School (NES).

    Cited by:

    1. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
    3. Daniel Houser & Jian Song, 2021. "Asymmetric Shocks in Contests: Theory and Experiment," Working Papers 1081, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    4. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 40-50.
    5. Zhu, Weichao & Wang, Lu & Lang, Youze, 2022. "The costs and benefits of tournament in a frictional labor market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    6. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    7. Doron Klunover, 2020. "Nice guys don't always finish last: succeeding in hierarchical organizations," Papers 2007.04435, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.

  5. Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, New Economic School (NES).

    Cited by:

    1. Mathias Reynaert & James M. Sallee, 2021. "Who Benefits When Firms Game Corrective Policies?," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 372-412, February.
    2. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Rhodes, Andrew & Wilson, Chris, 2015. "False Advertising," TSE Working Papers 15-614, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2017.
    4. Janssen, Maarten & Roy, Santanu, 2017. "Regulating False Disclosure," CEPR Discussion Papers 12450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Fake News," IZA Discussion Papers 11207, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Yasui, Yuta, 2021. "Controlling Fake Reviews," MPRA Paper 108177, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Regulating False Discloure," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168159, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Kemal Kıvanç Aköz & Cemal Eren Arbatli & Levent Celik, 2020. "Manipulation Through Biased Product Reviews," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 591-639, December.

  6. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Working Papers wp2017_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.

  7. Dmitry Ryvkin & Mikhail Drugov, 2017. "Tournaments," Working Papers wp2017_03_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.

    Cited by:

    1. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.

  8. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2016. "Biased contests for symmetric players," MPRA Paper 75378, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
    2. Heijnen, Pim & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2019. "Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 103-114.
    3. Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser, 2016. "Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6274, CESifo.
    4. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    5. Benoit S Y Crutzen & Sabine Flamand, 2021. "Leaders, Factions and Electoral Success," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-041/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Federico Echenique & Anqi Li, 2022. "Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps," Papers 2212.08219, arXiv.org.
    7. Denter, Philipp & Sisak, Dana, 2016. "Head starts in dynamic tournaments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 94-97.
    8. Engelbert J. Dockner & Steffen Jørgensen, 2018. "Strategic Rivalry for Market Share: A Contest Theory Approach to Dynamic Advertising Competition," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 468-489, September.
    9. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2020. "A general framework for studying contests," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224601, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    11. Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2021. "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete," Working Papers 2104, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    12. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
    13. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
    14. Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2016. "The Adverse Consequences Of Tournaments: Evidence From A Field Experiment," Working Papers 201607, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    15. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Optimal favoritism in contests with identity-contingent prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 40-50.
    16. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers w0278, New Economic School (NES).
    17. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Winner’s effort maximization in large contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    19. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Confidence Management in Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 27186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
    21. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Working Papers wp2017_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    22. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    23. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Microfounded Contest Design," Working Papers 2003, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    24. Malin Arve & Olga Chiappinelli, 2021. "The Role of Budget Constraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1059-1087, October.
    25. Aner Sela & Yizhaq Minchuk, 2022. "Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete," Working Papers 2204, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    26. Noam Cohen & Guy Maor & Aner Sela, 2018. "Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 177-192, December.
    27. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman & Szech, Nora, 2020. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Studie of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224585, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    28. Timothy Mathews & Soiliou Daw Namoro & James W. Boudreau, 2023. "The Impact of Organizer Market Structure on Participant Entry Behavior in a Multi-Tournament Environment," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-21, January.
    29. Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    30. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2020. "Extractive contest design," Papers 2006.01808, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    31. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jan 2021.
    32. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 2020. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    33. Serena, Marco, 2017. "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 15-25.
    34. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022. "Simple equilibria in general contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
    35. Drugov, Mikhail, 2015. "Optimal Patronage," CEPR Discussion Papers 10343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    36. Shelegia, Sandro & Wilson, Chris M., 2022. "Costly participation and default allocations in all-pay contests," MPRA Paper 115027, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  9. Drugov, Mikhail & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2014. "Financing experimentation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68219, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Spiganti, 2022. "Wealth Inequality and the Exploration of Novel Alternatives," Working Papers 2022:02, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    2. Catherine Bobtcheff & Raphaël Levy, 2017. "More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 148-186, August.
    3. Oleg Muratov, 2020. "Entrepreneur-Investor Information Design," Diskussionsschriften dp2014, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    4. Canidio, Andrea & Legros, Patrick, 2016. "The Value of Entrepreneurial Failures: Task Allocation and Career Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 11295, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Canidio, Andrea & Legros, Patrick, 2019. "Task Discretion, Labor Market Frictions and Entrepreneurship," CEPR Discussion Papers 13954, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Alessandro Spiganti, 2020. "Can Starving Start‐ups Beat Fat Labs? A Bandit Model of Innovation with Endogenous Financing Constraint," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(2), pages 702-731, April.

  10. Mikhail Drugov & Roberto Hernán-González & Praveen Kujal & Marta Troya Martinez, 2013. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment," Working Papers 13-32, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Altmann, Steffen & Falk, Armin & Grunewald, Andreas, 2015. "Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 516, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens, 2020. "Big Data and Democracy," Other publications TiSEM ecc11d8d-1478-4dd2-b570-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Xinyu Li & Ronald Peeters, 2016. "Cheap Talk with Multiple Strategically Interacting Audiences: An Experimental Study," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(10), pages 1-14, October.
    4. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.

  11. Drugov, Mikhail & Troya Martinez, Marta, 2012. "Vague Lies: How to Advise Consumers When They Complain," CEPR Discussion Papers 9201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. Troya-Martinez, Marta, 2016. "Vagueness and information-sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 301-320.

  12. Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2011. "Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment," Working Papers wp2011_01_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.

    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Ezquerra, Lara & Kujal, Praveen, 2020. "Self-selecting into being a dictator: Distributional consequences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    3. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    4. Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & José García-Montalvo, 2016. "The Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research," Working Papers 908, Barcelona School of Economics.
    5. Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Embezzlement and guilt aversion," Post-Print halshs-02073561, HAL.
    6. Lucas C. Coffman, 2017. "Fundraising Intermediaries Inhibit Quality-Driven Charitable Donations," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 409-424, January.
    7. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Heller, C.-Philipp & Kübler, Dorothea & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2021. "How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 2127-2151.
    8. Köbis, Nils & Bonnefon, Jean-François & Rahwan, Iyad, 2021. "Bad machines corrupt good morals," TSE Working Papers 21-1212, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Vranka, Marek Albert & Bahník, Štěpán, 2017. "Predictors of Bribe-Taking: The Role of Bribe Size and Personality," OSF Preprints mzhkq, Center for Open Science.
    10. Lambsdorff Johann Graf & Schulze Günther G., 2015. "Guest Editorial: Special Issue on Corruption at the Grassroots-level: What Can We Know About Corruption?," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(2), pages 100-114, April.
    11. Kandul, Serhiy & Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2018. "Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects when lies can be delegated," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 70-78.
    12. Bobkova, Nina & Egbert, Henrik, 2012. "Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature," MPRA Paper 38163, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Wu, Jiabin, 2016. "Indirect Higher Order Beliefs and Cooperation," MPRA Paper 69600, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Fredriksson, Anders, 2014. "Bureaucracy intermediaries, corruption and red tape," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 256-273.
    15. Sean M. Collins & John R. Hamman & John P. Lightle, 2018. "Market Interaction and Pro‐Social Behavior: An Experimental Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(3), pages 692-715, January.
    16. Jean-Benoit Falisse & Nastassia Leszczynska, 2015. "Professional Identity, Bribery and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Burundi," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-07, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    17. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty corruption and citizen feedback," Working Papers 2015/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    18. Parra, Daniel & Muñoz-Herrera, Manuel & Palacio, Luis A., 2021. "The limits of transparency in reducing corruption," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    19. Hans J. Czap & Natalia V. Czap, 2019. "‘I Gave You More’: Discretionary Power in a Corruption Experiment," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 32(2), pages 200-217, July.
    20. Argenton, Cedric & Potters, Jan & Yang, Yadi, 2022. "Receiving Credit : On Delegation and Responsibility," Other publications TiSEM 0f4ecd49-26e3-46c3-bd00-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    21. Bahník, Štěpán & Vranka, Marek A., 2022. "Experimental test of the effects of punishment probability and size on the decision to take a bribe," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    22. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2021. "Machiavelli Preferences Without Blame: Delegating Selfish vs. Generous Decisions in Dictator Games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    23. Sokolovska, Olena & Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2015. "Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis," MPRA Paper 66423, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.
    24. Serhiy Kandul & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2016. "Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects of delegation of lying," Jena Economics Research Papers 2016-011, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    25. Margarita Leib & Nils C. Kobis & Rainer Michael Rilke & Marloes Hagens & Bernd Irlenbusch, 2021. "The corruptive force of AI-generated advice," Papers 2102.07536, arXiv.org.
    26. Roel van Veldhuizen, 2012. "The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-038/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    27. Liang, Pinghan & Meng, Juanjuan, 2016. "Favor transmission and social image concern: An experimental study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 14-21.
    28. Francesca Gino & Michael I. Norton & Roberto A. Weber, 2016. "Motivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting Egoistically," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(3), pages 189-212, Summer.
    29. Stephanie Rosch & Sharon Raszap Skorbiansky & Collin Weigel & Kent D. Messer & Daniel Hellerstein, 2021. "Barriers to Using Economic Experiments in Evidence‐Based Agricultural Policymaking," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 531-555, June.
    30. Maria Vittoria Levati & Chiara Nardi, 2019. "The power of words in a petty corruption experiment," Working Papers 18/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    31. Roberta Muramatsu & Ana Maria Bianchi, 2021. "The big picture of corruption: Five lessons from Behavioral Economics," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 5(S3), pages 55-62, October.
    32. Dean A. Shepherd & Vinit Parida & Joakim Wincent, 2021. "Bribery from a micro, demand-side perspective," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 1661-1680, December.
    33. Michael A. Sartor & Paul W. Beamish, 2020. "Private Sector Corruption, Public Sector Corruption and the Organizational Structure of Foreign Subsidiaries," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 167(4), pages 725-744, December.
    34. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2019. "Lying through others: Does delegation promote deception?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 59-73.
    35. Jin Zheng & Arthur Schram & Gönül Doğan, 2021. "Friend or foe? Social ties in bribery and corruption," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 854-882, September.
    36. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Corruption and Hold-Up: The Role of Intermediaries," Department of Economics Working Papers 12/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    37. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty Corruption and Citizen Reports," CESifo Working Paper Series 5528, CESifo.

  13. Drugov, Mikhail, 2011. "Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1102, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  14. Mikhail Drugov, 2007. "Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption," Economics Series Working Papers 369, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & José García-Montalvo, 2016. "The Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research," Working Papers 908, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," UB Economics Working Papers 2022/417, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, UB School of Economics.
    3. Nikita Zakharov, 2017. "Does Corruption Hinder Investment? Evidence from Russian Regions," Discussion Paper Series 33, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Feb 2017.
    4. Aurelian-Petrus PLOPEANU & Daniel HOMOCIANU, 2021. "Analysis of bribery predictors for the student population. Evidence from Romania and Moldova," Eastern Journal of European Studies, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 12, pages 104-140, June.
    5. Vivekananda Mukherjee & Panchali Banerjee, 2015. "Does Introduction of Bureaucratic Competition Reduce Corruption in Public Service Delivery?," Working Papers id:7217, eSocialSciences.
    6. Mikhail Drugov, 2007. "Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption," Economics Series Working Papers 369, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. André Seidel, 2015. "Compliance Costs, Corruption and the Differentiation of Bureaucratic Services," CESifo Working Paper Series 5683, CESifo.
    8. Anna Kochanova, 2012. "The Impact of Bribery on Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp473, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    9. Lamar Pierce & Jason Snyder, 2015. "Unethical Demand and Employee Turnover," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 131(4), pages 853-869, November.
    10. Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier & Gustavo Piga, 2012. "Corruption, growth and ethnic fractionalization: a theoretical model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(2), pages 153-181, June.
    11. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco Alexander Schwarz, 2021. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," CESifo Working Paper Series 8968, CESifo.
    12. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2010. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-004, Harvard Business School, revised Feb 2012.
    13. Sergey V. Popov, 2016. "On Basu's Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes," Economics Working Papers 16-04, Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast.
    14. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 1558-1584, October.
    15. Vivekananda Mukherjee & Paramita Mukherjee & Saheli Bose, 2022. "Extortion, competition among states and private investment in a federation: evidence from Indian manufacturing sector," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 973-1004, May.
    16. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
    17. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2010. "How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty," Working Papers wp2010_09_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    18. Amrita Dillon & PRANAB BARDHAN, 2015. "Corruption and Development Policy (Drawing Upon the Recent Indian Debate)," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 472-479, August.
    19. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2015. "Is more competition always better? An experimental study of extortionary corruption," Working Papers wp2015_10_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    20. Popov, Sergey V., 2012. "Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation," MPRA Paper 43829, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Jan 2013.
    21. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2016. "The Industrial Organization of Corruption: Monopoly, Competition and Collusion," Working Papers wp2016_10_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    22. Victor Manuel Bennett & Lamar Pierce & Jason A. Snyder & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "Customer-Driven Misconduct: How Competition Corrupts Business Practices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(8), pages 1725-1742, August.
    23. Rupayan Pal & Preksha Jain & Prasenjit Banerjee, 2022. "The Environment and corruption: Monetary vs. Non-monetary Incentives and the first best," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2022-011, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    24. Fonseca-Mairena, María Haydée & Triossi, Matteo, 2019. "Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    25. Diaby, Aboubacar & Sylwester, Kevin, 2014. "Bureaucratic competition and public corruption: Evidence from transition countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 75-87.
    26. Arshed, Noman & Hanif, Nadia & Aziz, Osama & Croteau, Martin, 2022. "Exploring the potential of institutional quality in determining technological innovation," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    27. Hong, Fuhai & Yin, Zhendong, 2020. "Collusion, extortion and the government’s organizational structure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 1-23.
    28. Nicolas Campos & Eduardo Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2019. "Renegotiations and corruption in infrastructure: The Odebrecht case," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0230, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    29. Panchali Banerjee & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2020. "Bureaucratic competition versus monopoly: measuring corruption and welfare," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 51-65, June.
    30. Janssen, Aljoscha & Zhang, Xuan, 2020. "Retail Pharmacies and Drug Diversion during the Opioid Epidemic," Working Paper Series 1373, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    31. Jun Hu, 2021. "Asymmetric punishment, Leniency and Harassment Bribes in China: a selective survey," Working Papers hal-03119491, HAL.
    32. Lee, Chien-Chiang & Wang, Chih-Wei & Ho, Shan-Ju, 2020. "Country governance, corruption, and the likelihood of firms’ innovation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 326-338.
    33. Amadou Amadou Boly & Kole Keita & Assi Okara & Guei Guei C. Okou, 2021. "Effect of corruption on educational quantity and quality : theory and evidence," Working Papers hal-03194726, HAL.
    34. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Serra, Danila, 2020. "Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 439-451.
    35. De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    36. Amadou Amadou Boly & Kole Keita & Assi Okara & Guei Guei C. Okou, 2021. "Effect of corruption on educational quantity and quality : theory and evidence," CERDI Working papers hal-03194726, HAL.
    37. Victor Manuel Bennett & Lamar Pierce & Jason A. Snyder & Michael W. Toffel, 2012. "Competition and Illicit Quality," Harvard Business School Working Papers 12-071, Harvard Business School, revised May 2012.

  15. Mikhail Drugov, 2006. "Information and Delay in an Agency Model," Economics Series Working Papers 298, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Chillemi, Ottorino & Galavotti, Stefano & Gui, Benedetto, 2020. "Optimal contracts with contingent allocation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    2. Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and dynamic incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
    3. Raffaele Fiocco & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4758, CESifo.
    4. Mikhail Drugov, 2021. "Bargaining with informational and payoff externalities," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 398-419, May.
    5. Mikhail Drugov, 2010. "Information and delay in an agency model," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 598-615, September.
    6. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 2020. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.

    Cited by:

    1. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 14457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Hanming Fang & Ming Li & Zenan Wu, 2022. "Tournament-Style Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China," NBER Working Papers 30780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    4. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    5. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 005, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    6. Morgan, John & Tumlinson, Justin & Várdy, Felix, 2022. "The limits of meritocracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    7. Jiao, Qian & Ke, Changxia & Liu, Yang, 2022. "When to disclose the number of contestants: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 146-160.

  2. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya‐Martinez, 2019. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 298-315, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2014. "Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 78-99, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Drugov, Mikhail, 2010. "Competition in bureaucracy and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 107-114, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Mikhail Drugov, 2010. "Information and delay in an agency model," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 598-615, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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Featured entries

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:
  1. Top Russian Federation Economists

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 27 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (21) 2008-03-25 2012-11-11 2015-01-09 2015-02-05 2016-12-11 2017-04-09 2017-05-14 2017-06-04 2017-10-29 2018-07-09 2019-03-18 2019-03-18 2019-05-20 2019-05-27 2020-05-04 2020-09-14 2021-11-29 2022-03-28 2022-09-12 2022-09-19 2022-11-28. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (7) 2011-03-26 2014-01-17 2015-01-09 2016-12-11 2017-04-09 2017-06-04 2019-05-27. Author is listed
  3. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (6) 2017-05-14 2017-10-29 2019-03-18 2019-03-18 2019-05-20 2022-03-28. Author is listed
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (4) 2009-02-28 2011-03-26 2014-01-17 2022-03-28
  5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (4) 2017-10-29 2019-03-18 2019-05-27 2021-11-29
  6. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2011-03-26 2015-01-09 2021-11-29
  7. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (3) 2008-03-25 2018-07-09 2019-05-27
  8. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (3) 2019-05-20 2020-05-04 2020-07-20
  9. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2011-03-26 2019-05-20
  10. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2011-05-24 2014-01-17
  11. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2019-03-18 2019-03-18
  12. NEP-SPO: Sports & Economics (2) 2019-03-18 2022-03-28
  13. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2014-01-17
  14. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2015-02-05
  15. NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (1) 2017-06-04
  16. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (1) 2009-02-28
  17. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy (1) 2018-07-09
  18. NEP-MFD: Microfinance (1) 2009-02-28
  19. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2008-03-25

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