Mikhail Drugov

Personal Details

First Name:	Mikhail
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Drugov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pdr49
	http://sites.google.com/site/mdrugov/
Terminal Degree:	2009 Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

New Economic School (NES)

Moscow, Russia
http://www.nes.ru/

(7-495) 956-9508
(7-495) 956-9508
100, Novaya Street, Skolkovo, Moscow, 143025
RePEc:edi:nerasru (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Working Papers w0256, New Economic School (NES).
   • Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
   • Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 14457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

   Cited by:

   1. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 0. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

2. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
   • Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, New Economic School (NES).

   Cited by:

   1. March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2019. "The Perks of Being in the Smaller Team: Incentives in Overlapping Contests," Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203509, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
      • March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2019. "The perks of being in the smaller team: Incentives in overlapping contests," BERG Working Paper Series 155, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
      • Christoph March & Marco Sahm, 2019. "The Perks of Being in the Smaller Team: Incentives in Overlapping Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7994, CESifo.

3. Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
   • Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya‐Martinez, 2019. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 298-315, April.
   • Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, New Economic School (NES).

   Cited by:

   1. Rhodes, Andrew & Wilson, Chris, 2015. "False Advertising," TSE Working Papers 15-614, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2017.
      • Andrew Rhodes & Chris M. Wilson, 2018. "False advertising," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 348-369, June.
      • Rhodes, Andrew & Wilson, Chris M, 2016. "False Advertising," MPRA Paper 72693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Rhodes, Andrew & Wilson, Chris M, 2015. "False Advertising," MPRA Paper 68869, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Rhodes, Andrew & Wilson, Chris, 2017. "False Advertising," EconStor Preprints 128476, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
      • Andrew Rhodes & Chris M. Wilson, 2017. "False Advertising," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2015-13v3, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
   2. Reynaert, Mathias & Sallee, James M., 2016. "Who Benefits When Firms Game Corrective Policies?," TSE Working Papers 16-739, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Feb 2018.
      • Reynaert, Mathias & Sallee, James, 2019. "Who Benefits When Firms Game Corrective Policies?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   3. Janssen, Maarten & Roy, Santanu, 2017. "Regulating False Disclosure," CEPR Discussion Papers 12450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Maarten C. W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2017. "Regulating False Disclosure," Vienna Economics Papers 1705, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
   4. Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Regulating False Discloure," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168159, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
   5. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
   6. Grunewald, Andreas & Kräkel, Matthias, 2017. "Fake News," IZA Discussion Papers 11207, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

4. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

   Cited by:

   1. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Working Papers wp2017_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
      • Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2019. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 756-769.

5. Dmitry Ryvkin & Mikhail Drugov, 2017. "Tournaments," Working Papers wp2017_03_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.

   Cited by:

   1. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 0. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

6. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Working Papers wp2017_05_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University, revised Sep 2018.
   • Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
   • Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, New Economic School (NES).

   Cited by:

   1. Doron Klunover, 2020. "Nice guys don't always finish last: succeeding in hierarchical organizations," Papers 2007.04435, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
   2. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
      • Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, New Economic School (NES).
   3. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 0. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

7. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2016. "Biased contests for symmetric players," MPRA Paper 75378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.

   Cited by:

   1. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
      • Matthias Dahm & Patricia Esteve, 2014. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Discussion Papers 2014-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
      • Dahm, Matthias & Esteve, Patrícia,, 2013. "Affirmative Action through Extra Prizes," Working Papers 2072/222197, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
   2. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
      • Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2013. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," ECON - Working Papers 133, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2018.
   3. Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 005, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
      • Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2019. "A general framework for studying contests," MPRA Paper 97363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2019. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7993, CESifo.
   4. Heijnen, Pim & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 2019. "Rent-seeking with uncertain discriminatory power," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 103-114.
   5. Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser, 2016. "Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6274, CESifo.
      • Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018. "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
   6. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Working Papers wp2017_03_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
      • Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2019. "Contests between groups of unknown size," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 756-769.
   7. Noam Cohen & Guy Maor & Aner Sela, 2018. "Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 177-192, December.
   8. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
      • Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, New Economic School (NES).
   9. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 0. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
   10. René Kirkegaard, 2020. "Microfounded Contest Design," Working Papers 2003, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
   11. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2020. "Extractive contest design," Papers 2006.01808, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
   12. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
       • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich.
   13. Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2016. "The Adverse Consequences Of Tournaments: Evidence From A Field Experiment," Working Papers 201607, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
       • De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2016. "The Adverse Consequences of Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 9854, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
       • De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018. "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 1-18.
       • Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2018. "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00705, The Field Experiments Website.
   14. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   15. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Grünseis, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
   16. Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan, 0. "On the optimal design of biased contests," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
   17. Engelbert J. Dockner & Steffen Jørgensen, 2018. "Strategic Rivalry for Market Share: A Contest Theory Approach to Dynamic Advertising Competition," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 468-489, September.
   18. Serena, Marco, 2017. "Quality contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 15-25.
   19. Drugov, Mikhail, 2015. "Optimal Patronage," CEPR Discussion Papers 10343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   20. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2020. "Con?dence Management in Tournaments," PIER Working Paper Archive 20-017, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

8. Drugov, Mikhail & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2014. "Financing experimentation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68219, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   • Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
   • Macchiavello, Rocco, 2013. "Financing Experimentation," Economic Research Papers 270434, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

   Cited by:

   1. Catherine Bobtcheff & Raphaël Levy, 2017. "More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 148-186, August.
      • Bobtcheff, Catherine & Levy, Raphaël, 2015. "More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing," TSE Working Papers 15-571, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   2. Alessandro Spiganti, 2020. "Can Starving Start‐ups Beat Fat Labs? A Bandit Model of Innovation with Endogenous Financing Constraint," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(2), pages 702-731, April.
   3. Canidio, Andrea & Legros, Patrick, 2016. "The Value of Entrepreneurial Failures: Task Allocation and Career Concerns," CEPR Discussion Papers 11295, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   4. Canidio, Andrea & Legros, Patrick, 2019. "Task Discretion, Labor Market Frictions and Entrepreneurship," CEPR Discussion Papers 13954, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

9. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

   Cited by:

   1. Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2016. "Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values," Working Papers 827, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
      • Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2017. "Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 2007-2040, July.
      • Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2015. "Information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values," Economics Working Papers 1482, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2016.
      • Vladimir Asriyan, 2015. "Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values," 2015 Meeting Papers 711, Society for Economic Dynamics.

10. Mikhail Drugov & Roberto Hernán-González & Praveen Kujal & Marta Troya Martinez, 2013. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment," Working Papers 13-32, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. Altmann, Steffen & Falk, Armin & Grunewald, Andreas, 2015. "Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 516, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
       • Altmann, Steffen & Falk, Armin & Grunewald, Andreas, 2013. "Incentives and Information as Driving Forces of Default Effects," IZA Discussion Papers 7610, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens, 2020. "Big Data and Democracy," Other publications TiSEM be2ffeae-1e75-4a5b-9860-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
       • van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens, 2020. "Big Data and Democracy," Discussion Paper 2020-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
       • van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens, 2020. "Big Data and Democracy," Discussion Paper 2020-003, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
       • van Gils, Freek & Müller, Wieland & Prüfer, Jens, 2020. "Big Data and Democracy," Other publications TiSEM ecc11d8d-1478-4dd2-b570-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Seda Ertac & Levent Kockesen & Duygu Ozdemir, 2015. "The Role of Verifiability and Privacy in the Strategic Provision of Performance Feedback: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1524, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
       • Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.

11. Drugov, Mikhail & Troya Martinez, Marta, 2012. "Vague Lies: How to Advise Consumers When They Complain," CEPR Discussion Papers 9201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Troya-Martinez, Marta, 2016. "Vagueness and information-sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 301-320.
    2. Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
       • Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, New Economic School (NES).
       • Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya‐Martinez, 2019. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 298-315, April.

12. Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2011. "Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment," Working Papers wp2011_01_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    • Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2014. "Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 78-99, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    3. Gawn, Glynis & Innes, Robert, 2019. "Lying through others: Does delegation promote deception?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 59-73.
    4. Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & José García-Montalvo, 2016. "The Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research," Working Papers 908, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
       • Roberto Burguet & Juan José Ganuza & José Garcia Montalvo, 2016. "The microeconomics of corruption. A review of thirty years of research," Economics Working Papers 1525, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    5. Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Embezzlement and guilt aversion," Post-Print halshs-02073561, HAL.
       • Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," Working Papers halshs-01981632, HAL.
       • Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2018. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," Working Papers halshs-01779145, HAL.
       • Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Embezzlement and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 409-429.
       • Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2018. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," Working Papers 1807, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
       • Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2018. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," IZA Discussion Papers 11956, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. van Veldhuizen, Roel, 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials' corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-210, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    7. Jean-Benoit Falisse & Nastassia Leszczynska, 2015. "Professional Identity, Bribery and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Burundi," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-07, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty corruption and citizen feedback," Working Papers 2015/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    9. Roel van Veldhuizen, 2012. "The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-038/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Hans J. Czap & Natalia V. Czap, 2019. "‘I Gave You More’: Discretionary Power in a Corruption Experiment," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , vol. 32(2), pages 200-217, July.
    11. Lucas C. Coffman, 2017. "Fundraising Intermediaries Inhibit Quality-Driven Charitable Donations," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 409-424, January.
    12. Liang, Pinghan & Meng, Juanjuan, 2016. "Favor transmission and social image concern: An experimental study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 14-21.
    13. Vranka, Marek Albert & Bahník, Štěpán, 2017. "Predictors of Bribe-Taking: The Role of Bribe Size and Personality," OSF Preprints mzhkq, Center for Open Science.
    14. Lambsdorff Johann Graf & Schulze Günther G., 2015. "Guest Editorial: Special Issue on Corruption at the Grassroots-level: What Can We Know About Corruption?," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(2), pages 100-114, April.
    15. Kandul, Serhiy & Kirchkamp, Oliver, 2018. "Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects when lies can be delegated," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 70-78.
    16. van Veldhuizen, R., 2013. "The influence of wages on public officials’ corruptibility: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 341-356.
    17. Francesca Gino & Michael I. Norton & Roberto A. Weber, 2016. "Motivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting Egoistically," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(3), pages 189-212, Summer.
    18. Fredriksson, Anders, 2010. "Bureaucracy intermediaries, corruption and red tape," SITE Working Paper Series 10, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
        • Anders Fredriksson, 2013. "Bureaucracy Intermediaries, Corruption and Red Tape," Working Papers 1202, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
        • Fredriksson, Anders, 2014. "Bureaucracy intermediaries, corruption and red tape," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 256-273.
    19. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Corruption and Hold-Up: The Role of Intermediaries," Department of Economics Working Papers 12/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    20. Sokolovska, Olena & Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2015. "Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis," MPRA Paper 66423, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2015.
    21. Serhiy Kandul & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2016. "Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects of delegation of lying," Jena Economic Research Papers 2016-011, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    22. Bobkova, Nina & Egbert, Henrik, 2012. "Corruption investigated in the lab: a survey of the experimental literature," MPRA Paper 38163, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    23. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty Corruption and Citizen Reports," CESifo Working Paper Series 5528, CESifo.
    24. Maria Vittoria Levati & Chiara Nardi, 2019. "The power of words in a petty corruption experiment," Working Papers 18/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    25. Wu, Jiabin, 2016. "Indirect Higher Order Beliefs and Cooperation," MPRA Paper 69600, University Library of Munich, Germany.
        • Jiabin Wu, 2018. "Indirect higher order beliefs and cooperation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 858-876, December.
    26. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Heller, Christian-Philipp & Kübler, Dorothea & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "How to avoid black markets for appointments with online booking systems," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-210, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
        • Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Heller, Christian-Philipp & Kübler, Dorothea & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 179, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

13. Drugov, Mikhail, 2011. "Intra-firm bargaining and learning in a market equilibrium," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1102, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

14. Mikhail Drugov, 2007. "Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption," Economics Series Working Papers 369, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Drugov, Mikhail, 2010. "Competition in bureaucracy and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 107-114, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Popov, Sergey V, 2017. "On Basu’s Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2017/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
       • Sergey V. Popov, 2016. "On Basu's Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes," Economics Working Papers 16-04, Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast.
    2. Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & José García-Montalvo, 2016. "The Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research," Working Papers 908, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
       • Roberto Burguet & Juan José Ganuza & José Garcia Montalvo, 2016. "The microeconomics of corruption. A review of thirty years of research," Economics Working Papers 1525, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Amrita Dillon & PRANAB BARDHAN, 2015. "Corruption and Development Policy (Drawing Upon the Recent Indian Debate)," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 472-479, August.
    4. Nikita Zakharov, 2017. "Does Corruption Hinder Investment? Evidence from Russian Regions," Discussion Paper Series 33, Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg, revised Feb 2017.
       • Zakharov, Nikita, 2019. "Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 39-61.
    5. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2015. "Is more competition always better? An experimental study of extortionary corruption," Working Papers wp2015_10_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
       • Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2019. "Is More Competition Always Better? An Experimental Study Of Extortionary Corruption," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 50-72, January.
    6. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2010. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-004, Harvard Business School, revised Feb 2012.
    7. Vivekananda Mukherjee & Panchali Banerjee, 2015. "Does Introduction of Bureaucratic Competition Reduce Corruption in Public Service Delivery?," Working Papers id:7217, eSocialSciences.
       • Banerjee, Panchali & Mukherjee, Vivekananda, 2015. "Does Introduction of Bureaucratic Competition Reduce Corruption in Public Service Delivery?," Working Papers 15/152, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    8. Popov, Sergey V., 2012. "Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation," MPRA Paper 43829, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Jan 2013.
       • Sergey V. Popov, 2015. "Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(1), pages 108-125, January.
    9. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2016. "The Industrial Organization of Corruption: Monopoly, Competition and Collusion," Working Papers wp2016_10_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    10. Ronald Fischer & Nicolás Campos & Eduardo Engel & Alexander Galetovic, 2019. "Renegotiations and Corruption in Infrastructure: The Odebrecht Case," Documentos de Trabajo 345, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
        • Nicolas Campos & Eduardo Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2019. "Renegotiations and corruption in infrastructure: The Odebrecht case," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0230, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    11. Victor Manuel Bennett & Lamar Pierce & Jason A. Snyder & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "Customer-Driven Misconduct: How Competition Corrupts Business Practices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(8), pages 1725-1742, August.
    12. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Serra, Danila, 2012. "How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 466-477.
        • Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2010. "How corruptible are you? Bribery under uncertainty," Working Papers wp2010_09_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    13. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    14. André Seidel, 2015. "Compliance Costs, Corruption and the Differentiation of Bureaucratic Services," CESifo Working Paper Series 5683, CESifo.
    15. Anna Kochanova, 2012. "The Impact of Bribery on Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp473, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    16. Lamar Pierce & Jason Snyder, 2015. "Unethical Demand and Employee Turnover," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 131(4), pages 853-869, November.
    17. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Serra, Danila, 2020. "Corruption and competition among bureaucrats: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 439-451.
    18. Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier & Gustavo Piga, 2012. "Corruption, growth and ethnic fractionalization: a theoretical model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(2), pages 153-181, June.
        • Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier & Gustavo Piga, 2011. "Corruption, Growth and Ethnic Fractionalization: a Theoretical Model," CEIS Research Paper 216, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 08 Nov 2011.
    19. Diaby, Aboubacar & Sylwester, Kevin, 2014. "Bureaucratic competition and public corruption: Evidence from transition countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 75-87.
    20. Lamar Pierce & Michael W. Toffel, 2013. "The Role of Organizational Scope and Governance in Strengthening Private Monitoring," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 1558-1584, October.
    21. Panchali Banerjee & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2020. "Bureaucratic competition versus monopoly: measuring corruption and welfare," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 51-65, June.
    22. Victor Manuel Bennett & Lamar Pierce & Jason A. Snyder & Michael W. Toffel, 2012. "Competition and Illicit Quality," Harvard Business School Working Papers 12-071, Harvard Business School, revised May 2012.

15. Mikhail Drugov, 2006. "Information and Delay in an Agency Model," Economics Series Working Papers 298, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    • Mikhail Drugov, 2010. "Information and delay in an agency model," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 598-615, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Chillemi, Ottorino & Galavotti, Stefano & Gui, Benedetto, 2020. "Optimal contracts with contingent allocation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    2. Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and dynamic incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 495-520, September.
       • Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 9929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Delegation and Dynamic Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 4774, CESifo.
    3. Raffaele Fiocco & Roland Strausz, 2015. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 550-569, September.
       • Fiocco, Raffaele & Strausz, Roland, 2014. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 9928, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Raffaele Fiocco & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4758, CESifo.
       • Raffaele Fiocco & Roland Strausz, 2012. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2012-055, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    4. Mikhail Drugov, 2006. "Information and Delay in an Agency Model," Economics Series Working Papers 298, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
       • Mikhail Drugov, 2010. "Information and delay in an agency model," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 598-615, September.
    5. Drugov, Mikhail, 2014. "Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 10021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

1. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
   • Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 14457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Working Papers w0256, New Economic School (NES).
   See citations under working paper version above.
2. Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya‐Martinez, 2019. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 298-315, April.
   • Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
   • Mikhail Drugov & Marta Troya-Martinez, 2018. "Vague lies and lax standards of proof: On the law and economics of advice," Working Papers w0246, New Economic School (NES).
   See citations under working paper version above.
3. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Biased contests for symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
   • Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2016. "Biased contests for symmetric players," MPRA Paper 75378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   See citations under working paper version above.
4. Mikhail Drugov & Rocco Macchiavello, 2014. "Financing Experimentation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 315-349, February.
   • Macchiavello, Rocco, 2013. "Financing Experimentation," Economic Research Papers 270434, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
   • Drugov, Mikhail & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2014. "Financing experimentation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68219, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2014. "Intermediaries in corruption: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 78-99, March.
   • Mikhail Drugov & John Hamman & Danila Serra, 2011. "Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment," Working Papers wp2011_01_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
   See citations under working paper version above.
6. Drugov, Mikhail, 2010. "Competition in bureaucracy and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 107-114, July.
   • Mikhail Drugov, 2007. "Competition in Bureaucracy and Corruption," Economics Series Working Papers 369, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
   See citations under working paper version above.
7. Mikhail Drugov, 2010. "Information and delay in an agency model," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 598-615, September.
   • Mikhail Drugov, 2006. "Information and Delay in an Agency Model," Economics Series Working Papers 298, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
   See citations under working paper version above.
8. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 0. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.

   Cited by:

   1. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
   2. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
      • Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Working Papers w0256, New Economic School (NES).
      • Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 14457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:

1. Top Russian Federation Economists

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 22 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (16) 2008-03-25 2012-11-11 2015-01-09 2015-02-05 2016-12-11 2017-04-09 2017-05-14 2017-06-04 2017-10-29 2018-07-09 2019-03-18 2019-03-18 2019-05-20 2019-05-27 2020-05-04 2020-09-14. Author is listed
2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (7) 2011-03-26 2014-01-17 2015-01-09 2016-12-11 2017-04-09 2017-06-04 2019-05-27. Author is listed
3. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (5) 2017-05-14 2017-10-29 2019-03-18 2019-03-18 2019-05-20. Author is listed
4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2009-02-28 2011-03-26 2014-01-17
5. NEP-DES: Economic Design (3) 2017-10-29 2019-03-18 2019-05-27
6. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (3) 2008-03-25 2018-07-09 2019-05-27
7. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (3) 2019-05-20 2020-05-04 2020-07-20
8. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2011-03-26 2019-05-20
9. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2011-03-26 2015-01-09
10. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2011-05-24 2014-01-17
11. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2019-03-18 2019-03-18
12. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2014-01-17
13. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2015-02-05
14. NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (1) 2017-06-04
15. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (1) 2009-02-28
16. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy (1) 2018-07-09
17. NEP-MFD: Microfinance (1) 2009-02-28
18. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2008-03-25
19. NEP-SPO: Sports & Economics (1) 2019-03-18

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