IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/17484.html

Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard

Author

Listed:
  • Drugov, Mikhail
  • Meyer, Margaret
  • Möller, Marc

Abstract

In dynamic promotion contests, where performance measurement is noisy and constrained to be ordinal, selection of the most able agent can be improved by biasing later stages in favor of early performers. We show that even in the worst-case scenario, where external random factors swamp the difference in agents' abilities in determining their relative performance, optimal bias is (i) strictly positive and (ii) locally insensitive to changes in the ratio of heterogeneity to noise. To explain these, arguably surprising, limiting results, we demonstrate a close relationship in the limit between optimal bias under ordinal information and the expected optimal bias when bias can be conditioned on cardinal information about relative performance. As a consequence of these two limiting properties, the simple rule of setting bias as if in the worst-case scenario achieves most of the potential gains in selective efficiency from biasing dynamic rank-order contests.

Suggested Citation

  • Drugov, Mikhail & Meyer, Margaret & Möller, Marc, 2022. "Selecting the Best when Selection is Hard," CEPR Discussion Papers 17484, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17484
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP17484
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Penghuan Yan, 2024. "Balancing Selection Efficiency and Societal Costs in Selective Contests," Papers 2409.09768, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:17484. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.