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International capital flows under asymmetric information and costly monitoring: implications of debt and equity financing

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  • Rebecca M. Neumann

Abstract

. The impact of increased equity trade on a small open economy is examined. Stochastic second‐period output depends on first‐period investment. Owing to information asymmetries, domestic agents cannot reveal credibly the level of first‐period investment to international financiers. Consistent with recent proposals to strengthen the international financial system, domestic firms choose to incur self‐monitoring costs to increase capital inflows. As an alternative to borrowing, domestic agents may sell ownership claims to second‐period output. When equity claims convey information, equity trade is preferred to international borrowing, consistent with developing economies’ observed reliance on international equity relative to debt in recent years. JEL Classification: F41, G15 Flux internationaux de capitaux quand l’information est asymétrique et la surveillance coûteuse : implications pour le financement par endettement et par transfert de propriété. Ce mémoire étudie les impacts sur une petite économie ouverte d’un commerce accru de droits de propriété dans un monde d’information asymétrique. On développe un modèle à deux périodes dans lequel le produit stochastique de la seconde période dépend de l’investissement dans la première période. Compte tenu des asymétries dans l’information, les entrepreneurs locaux ne peuvent révéler de manière crédible le niveau d’investissement de la première période aux financiers internationaux. Le mémoire examine d’abord les emprunts internationaux et montre que les entreprises locales choisissent de s’imposer des coûts d’auto surveillance pour accroître les flux de capitaux. Les agents locaux peuvent aussi, comme solution de rechange à l’emprunt, vendre des droits de propriété sur la production de la seconde période. Quand ces transactions des droits de propriété communiquent de l’information, le commerce de droits de propriété est préféréà l’emprunt.

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  • Rebecca M. Neumann, 2003. "International capital flows under asymmetric information and costly monitoring: implications of debt and equity financing," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(3), pages 674-700, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:36:y:2003:i:3:p:674-700
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5982.t01-2-00008
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    2. Rebecca M. Neumann, 2003. "International capital flows under asymmetric information and costly monitoring: implications of debt and equity financing," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(3), pages 674-700, August.
    3. Neumann, Rebecca M., 2006. "The effects of capital controls on international capital flows in the presence of asymmetric information," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1010-1027, October.
    4. Igan, Deniz & Lauwers, Alexandre & Puy, Damien, 2022. "Capital Flows and Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 17527, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Buch, Claudia M., 2002. "Business Cycle Volatility and Globalization: A Survey," Kiel Working Papers 1107, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. Keskinsoy, Bilal, 2017. "Taxi, Takeoff and Landing: Behavioural Patterns of Capital Flows to Emerging Markets," MPRA Paper 78129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Chander KANT, 2008. "Relationship between Different Types of Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries," EcoMod2008 23800056, EcoMod.
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    9. Mary Kathryn Campion & Rebecca M. Neumann, 2003. "Compositional Effects of Capital Controls – Theory and Evidence," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(7), pages 957-973, July.
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    12. Anyangah, Joshua Okeyo, 2010. "Financing investment in environmentally sound technologies: Foreign direct investment versus foreign debt finance," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 456-475, August.
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    JEL classification:

    • F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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