The Internal Economics of a University: Evidence from Personnel Data
Using a rich personnel data set of a large European university we find strong evidence for the existence of an internal labor market. First, there is a strong port of entry at the lowest academic rank and in fact even prior to entering professorship, resulting in very long internal careers. Second, wages do not follow external wage developments. We subsequently consider various incentive theories regarding the dynamics of promotions, as organized through annual tournaments. As expected, a rigid set of research and teaching criteria determine the speed of promotions. At the same time, administrative rigidities play an important role.
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