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What is the cost of retaining and attracting exceptional talents? Evidence from the Canada Research Chair program

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  • Courty, Pascal
  • Sim, John

Abstract

The compensation of a professor who is awarded an internal Canada Research Chair (CRC) increases by 6.3 percent on average in our sample. This gain is large initially but quickly erodes over CRC tenure. The gain is slightly larger for professors who change university to obtain a CRC Chair. Assuming that the CRC program has achieved its goal of attracting and retaining top talents, we infer that the compensation cost of doing so is modest. In addition, only a small fraction of the CRC grants have been passed through to professors as compensation increases. This is despite the fact that universities report spending more than half of the CRC grants on chairholder compensation.

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  • Courty, Pascal & Sim, John, 2012. "What is the cost of retaining and attracting exceptional talents? Evidence from the Canada Research Chair program," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 274614, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:quedwp:274614
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274614
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    Cited by:

    1. Seyed Reza Mirnezami & Catherine Beaudry, 2016. "The effect of holding a research chair on scientists’ productivity," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 107(2), pages 399-454, May.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand

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