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Hierarchy of governance institutions and the pecking order of privatisation: Central-Eastern Europe and Central Asia reconsidered

Listed author(s):
  • Tomasz Mickiewicz

This article discusses property rights, corporate governance frameworks and privatisation outcomes in the Central-Eastern Europe and Central Asia (CEECA) region. We argue that while CEECA still suffers from deficient 'higher order' institutions, this is not attracting sufficient attention from international institutions like EBRD and the World Bank, which focus on 'lower order' indicators. We discuss factors that may alleviate the negative impact of the weakness in institutional environment and argue for the pecking order of privatisation, where equivalent privatisation is given a priority but speed is not compromised.

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File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14631370903339823
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Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Post-Communist Economies.

Volume (Year): 21 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 399-423

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Handle: RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:21:y:2009:i:4:p:399-423
DOI: 10.1080/14631370903339823
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CPCE20

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