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Endogenous ownership structure: factors affecting the post-privatisation equity in largest Hungarian firms

Author

Listed:
  • Kate Bishop

    () (UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies)

  • Igor Filatotchev

    () (School of Management and Organisational Psychology, Birkbeck College)

  • Tomasz Mickiewicz

    () (UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies)

Abstract

Using a data set for 162 largest Hungarian firms during the period of 1994-1999 this paper explores the determinants of equity shares held by foreign investors and by Hungarian institutional investors.. We find evidence of a post-privatisation evolution towards more homogeneus equity structures, where dominant categories of owners aim at achieving controlling stakes. Here, the foreign investors and Hungarian institutional investors play the major role. In addition, focusing on firm level characteristics we find that the exporting firms attract foreign owners, who acquire controlling equity stakes. Similarly, the firm size measurements are positively associated with the presence of foreign investors. However, they negatively associated with 100% foreign ownership, since the marginal costs of acquiring additional equity are growing with the size of the assets. We interpret the results in light of the existing theory. In particular, following Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) we argue that equity should not be treated as an exogenous variable. As for specific determinants of equity levels, we focus on informational asymmetries and (unobserved) ownership specific characteristics of foreign investors and Hungarian investors.

Suggested Citation

  • Kate Bishop & Igor Filatotchev & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2002. "Endogenous ownership structure: factors affecting the post-privatisation equity in largest Hungarian firms," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 5, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
  • Handle: RePEc:see:wpaper:5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2009. "Hierarchy of governance institutions and the pecking order of privatisation: Central-Eastern Europe and Central Asia reconsidered," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 399-423.
    2. Aleksandra Gregoric & Arjana Brezigar Masten & Katarina Zajc, 2011. "From Social to Private Ownership: Multiple Blockholders in Slovenian Unlisted Firms," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(5), pages 27-51, September.
    3. Klaus Gugler & Dennis C. Mueller & Evgeni Peev, 2013. "Determinants of Ultimate Control of Large Firms in Transition Countries: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 275-303, June.
    4. Aleksandra Gregoric & Arjana Brezigar Masten & Katarina Zajc, 2011. "From Social to Private Ownership: Multiple Blockholders in Slovenian Unlisted Firms," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(5), pages 27-51, September.
    5. Kevin Campbell, 2002. "Ownership Structure and the Operating Performance of Hungarian Firms," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 9, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    6. Nancy Huyghebaert & Qi Quan, 2011. "Ownership Dynamics after Partial Privatization: Evidence from China," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 389-429.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ownership structure; Corporate Control; Foreign Investors; Privatisation;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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