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Union Power, Cost of Job Loss, and Workers' Effort

Author

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  • Francis Green
  • Steven McIntosh

Abstract

The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of external threats in raising workers' effort is mediated by, among other labor market conditions, the presence or absence of a powerful union. In particular, they argue that because powerful unions reduce the potency of the external threat of job loss (by making it more difficult for employers to dismiss workers), the pace of work is less responsive to such a threat in strongly unionized plants than in weakly unionized plants. The results of an analysis of data from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in Britain support this hypothesis. The analysis also yields evidence that effort is increased where workers are rewarded individually according to results, and where there are various communication channels between workers and management.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Green & Steven McIntosh, 1998. "Union Power, Cost of Job Loss, and Workers' Effort," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 51(3), pages 363-383, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:51:y:1998:i:3:p:363-383
    DOI: 10.1177/001979399805100301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Green, Francis & McIntosh, Steven, 2001. "The intensification of work in Europe," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 291-308, May.
    2. Michael Bittman & Judith E. Brown & Judy Wajcman, 2009. "The mobile phone, perpetual contact and time pressure," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 23(4), pages 673-691, December.
    3. Gary Slater & David A. Spencer, 2014. "Workplace relations, unemployment and finance-dominated capitalism," Review of Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 2(2), pages 134-146, April.
    4. Peter Skott & Frederick Guy, 2005. "Power-Biased Technological Change and the Rise in Earnings Inequality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2005-17, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    5. Frederick Guy & Peter Skott, 2008. "Information and Communications Technologies, Coordination and Control, and the Distribution of Income," Journal of Income Distribution, Ad libros publications inc., vol. 17(3-4), pages 71-92, September.
    6. K Clark & M Tomlinson, 2001. "The Determinants of Work Effort: Evidence from the Employment in Britain Survey," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0113, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    7. Nancy Bertaux & Hervé Queneau, 2002. "The social economics of job security," Forum for Social Economics, Springer;The Association for Social Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 1-19, September.
    8. Anthony Eisenbarth & Zhuo Fu Chen, 2022. "The evolution of wage inequality within local U.S. labor markets," Journal for Labour Market Research, Springer;Institute for Employment Research/ Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), vol. 56(1), pages 1-25, December.
    9. Gospel, Howard., 2003. "Quality of working life : a review on changes in work organization, conditions of employment and work-life arrangements," ILO Working Papers 993623463402676, International Labour Organization.
    10. Fumio Ohtake, 2003. "Unions, the Costs of Job Loss, and Vacation," NBER Chapters, in: Labor Markets and Firm Benefit Policies in Japan and the United States, pages 371-390, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Frederick Guy & Peter Skott, 2008. "Power, Productivity, and Profits," Springer Books, in: Matthew Braham & Frank Steffen (ed.), Power, Freedom, and Voting, chapter 20, pages 385-403, Springer.
    12. Senney, Garrett T. & Dunn, Lucia F., 2019. "The role of work schedules and the macroeconomy on labor effort," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-34.
    13. César Rodríguez Gutiérrez & Juan Francisco Canal Domínguez, 2012. "Is Workers' Effort Sensitive to Contract Type and Firm Ownership? The Spanish Case," Revista de Economía Laboral - Spanish Journal of Labour Economics, Asociación Española de Economía Laboral - AEET, vol. 9, pages 1-27.
    14. Michelle Brown & John Heywood, 2009. "Helpless in Finance: The Cost of Helping Effort Among Bank Employees," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 30(2), pages 176-195, June.
    15. Francis Green, 2002. "Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?," Studies in Economics 0207, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    16. Francis Green, 2000. "Why has Work Effort become more intense? Conjectures and Evidence about Effort-Biased Technical Change and other stories," Studies in Economics 0003, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    17. Francis Green, 1999. "It's been a hard day's night: The concentration and intensification of work in late 20th century Britain," Studies in Economics 9913, School of Economics, University of Kent.

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