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Why is Corruption Less Harmful to Income Inequality in Latin America?

Listed author(s):
  • Dobson, Stephen
  • Ramlogan-Dobson, Carlyn

Conventional wisdom says corruption is bad for income inequality. But recent research on Latin America finds a trade-off between corruption and inequality and suggests this is due to the large informal sector in the region. Using data on a large sample of countries we find that the informal sector impacts the link between corruption and inequality. In particular, the marginal impact of corruption becomes negative once the informal sector becomes large. This is true in Latin America and more generally. Corruption reducing policies should be accompanied by measures that help displaced informal sector workers.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X1200085X
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

Volume (Year): 40 (2012)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
Pages: 1534-1545

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Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:8:p:1534-1545
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.015
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

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