Corruption And The Shadow Economy
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Other versions of this item:
- Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2002. "Corruption and the Shadow Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 633, CESifo Group Munich.
- Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "Corruption and the shadow economy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 02/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufman & Andrei Shleifer, 1997. "The Unofficial Economy in Transition," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(2), pages 159-240.
- Eric Friedman & Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufmann & Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, 1999. "Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69," Departmental Working Papers 199921, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2004.
"The Economics of Repeated Extortion,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 203-223, Summer.
- Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 1998. "The Economics of Repeated Extortion," CESifo Working Paper Series 172, CESifo Group Munich.
- Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003. "The economics of repeated extortion," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 13/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
- Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2003.
"The dynamics of corruption with the ratchet effect,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 427-443, March.
- Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2000. "The Dynamics of Corruption with the Ratchet Effect," CESifo Working Paper Series 334, CESifo Group Munich.
- Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2001. "The dynamics of corruption with the Ratchet effect," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 04/01, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Marcouiller, Douglas & Young, Leslie, 1995. "The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 630-646, June.
- Rauch, James E., 1991. "Modelling the informal sector formally," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 33-47, January.
- Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-246, April.
- Kolm, Serge-Christophe, 1973. "A note on optimum tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 265-270, July.
- Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobatón, Pablo, 1998. "Corruption, public finances and the unofficial economy," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34372, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
- Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
- repec:hrv:faseco:30728045 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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