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Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft

  • Marcel Thum

Dieser Beitrag setzt sich mit dem Verhältnis von Schattenwirtschaft und Korruptionauseinander. Es wird insbesondere die Frage untersucht, welche Rolle die Schattenwirtschaftin korrupten Ökonomien spielt. Die Schattenwirtschaft begrenzt letztendlich dieMacht korrupter Institutionen, indem sie Unternehmen eine Ausweichmöglichkeitschafft, und ermöglicht so eine Ausdehnung produktiver Tätigkeiten, die gesamtwirtschaftlichvorteilhaft ist. Der Beitrag untersucht auch, wie sich institutionelle Rahmenbedingungenund Politikmaßnahmen auf Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft auswirken.

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Paper provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its series Ifo Working Paper Series with number Ifo Working Papers No.12.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_no.12
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  1. Rashid, Salim, 1981. "Public Utilities in Egalitarian LDC's: The Role of Bribery in Achieving Pareto Efficiency," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 448-60.
  2. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-11, February.
  3. Ira N. Gang & Amal Sanyal & Omkar Goswami, 1998. "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Departmental Working Papers 199604, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  4. Adam, M.C. & Ginsburgh, V., . "The effects of irregular markets on macroeconomic policy. Some estimates for Belgium," CORE Discussion Papers RP -662, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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  6. Choi, Jay Pil & Thum, Marcel, 2001. "The dynamics of corruption with the Ratchet effect," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 04/01, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
  7. Axel Dreher & Christos Kotsogiannis & Steve McCorriston, 2005. "How do Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy?," Public Economics 0502012, EconWPA, revised 24 Feb 2005.
  8. Loayza, Norman V., 1996. "The economics of the informal sector: a simple model and some empirical evidence from Latin America," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 129-162, December.
  9. Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2005. "Corruption And The Shadow Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(3), pages 817-836, 08.
  10. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-23, October.
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  12. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
  13. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
  14. Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Survey techniques to measure and explain corruption," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3071, The World Bank.
  15. Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Thiele, Henrik, 1999. "Corruption under moral hazard," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2204, The World Bank.
  16. Friedrich Schneider & Robert Klinglmair, 2004. "Shadow Economies Around the World: What Do We Know?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  17. Edward L. Glaeser & Raven Saks, 2004. "Corruption in America," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2043, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  18. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  19. Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1997. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," DELTA Working Papers 97-06, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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  22. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January.
  23. Marcouiller, Douglas & Young, Leslie, 1995. "The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 630-46, June.
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