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Korruption

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  • Thum, Marcel

Abstract

Korruption ist ein globales Phänomen, das vor allem für viele Entwicklungsländer als Wachstumsbremse wirkt. Der Beitrag zeigt, wie man mittels eines einfachen industrieökonomischen Modells die Wirkungsmechanismen der Korruption analysieren kann. Korruption hält Unternehmen vom Markteintritt ab, da Bestechungszahlungen wie eine Eintrittsgebühr in den Markt wirken. Wie hoch diese Eintrittsbarriere ist, hängt entscheidend von der "Marktstruktur" der korrupten Ökonomie ab.

Suggested Citation

  • Thum, Marcel, 2004. "Korruption," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 11/04, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuddps:1104
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Korruption; Markteintritt;

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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