IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v103y2018icp268-283.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops: Evidence from Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Muñoz-Mora, Juan Carlos
  • Tobón, Santiago
  • d’Anjou, Jesse Willem

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of the formalization of land property rights in the war against illicit crops, using the case of Colombia. We argue that as a consequence of the increase in state presence and visibility, municipalities with a higher level of formalization of their land property rights witnessed a greater reduction in the area allocated to illicit crops. We hypothesize that this is due to the possibility of obtaining more benefits in the newly installed institutional environment when land is formalized, and the increased cost of growing illicit crops on formal relative to informal land. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the formality index for smallholders is related to a reduction in the share of municipal area allocated to coca crops of 0.101 percentage points. That is, the formalization of one additional hectare of land with respect to small landholders in an average municipality in the year 2000 is associated with a decrease of approximately 1.4 hectares of land allocated to coca within that particular municipality, ceteris paribus. These results remain robust to a number of sensitivity analyses. Our findings contribute to empirical evidence on the positive effects of formal land property rights and effective policies in the war on drugs.

Suggested Citation

  • Muñoz-Mora, Juan Carlos & Tobón, Santiago & d’Anjou, Jesse Willem, 2018. "The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops: Evidence from Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 268-283.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:103:y:2018:i:c:p:268-283
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X17303455
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fergusson, Leopoldo, 2013. "The political economy of rural property rights and the persistence of the dual economy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 167-181.
    2. Ibanez, Marcela & Carlsson, Fredrik, 2010. "A survey-based choice experiment on coca cultivation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 249-263, November.
    3. Joshua D. Angrist & Adriana D. Kugler, 2008. "Rural Windfall or a New Resource Curse? Coca, Income, and Civil Conflict in Colombia," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(2), pages 191-215, May.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Easterly, William, 2007. "Inequality does cause underdevelopment: Insights from a new instrument," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 755-776, November.
    6. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
    7. Barraclough, Solon L, 1970. "Agricultural Policy and Land Reform," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(4), pages 906-947, Part II, .
    8. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2006. "Tenure security and land-related investment: Evidence from Ethiopia," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1245-1277, July.
    9. Daniel Mejia & Daniel M. Rico, 2010. "La microeconomía de la producción y tráfico de cocaína en Colombia," Documentos CEDE 007293, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.
    10. K. Deininger & S. Jin & H. K. Nagarajan, 2009. "Land Reforms, Poverty Reduction, and Economic Growth: Evidence from India," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(4), pages 496-521.
    11. repec:oup:wbecrv:v:31:y:2017:i:2:p:570-594. is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Klaus Deininger & Daniel Ayalew Ali & Takashi Yamano, 2008. "Legal Knowledge and Economic Development: The Case of Land Rights in Uganda," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(4), pages 593-619.
    13. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2000. "Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(2), pages 389-430.
    14. Cameron, A. Colin & Gelbach, Jonah B. & Miller, Douglas L., 2011. "Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 29(2), pages 238-249.
    15. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1995. "Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations," Handbook of Development Economics,in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 42, pages 2659-2772 Elsevier.
    16. Conning, Jonathan H. & Robinson, James A., 2007. "Property rights and the political organization of agriculture," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 416-447, March.
    17. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(01), pages 115-131, February.
    18. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Paul J. Gertler & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2002. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 239-280, April.
    19. Timothy J. Besley & Konrad B. Burchardi & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2012. "Incentives and the De Soto Effect," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 237-282.
    20. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    21. Andre, Catherine & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1998. "Land relations under unbearable stress: Rwanda caught in the Malthusian trap," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-47, January.
    22. Macours, Karen & Janvry, Alain de & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2010. "Insecurity of property rights and social matching in the tenancy market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 880-899, October.
    23. Deininger, Klaus & Chamorro, Juan Sebastian, 2004. "Investment and equity effects of land regularisation: the case of Nicaragua," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 101-116, March.
    24. Galiani, Sebastian & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2010. "Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 700-729, October.
    25. Darwin Cortés & Juan F. Vargas & Laura Hincapié & María del Rosario Franco, 2012. "Seguridad Democrática, presencia de la Policía y conflicto en Colombia," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE, June.
    26. Carter, Michael R, 1984. "Identification of the Inverse Relationship between Farm Size and Productivity: An Empirical Analysis of Peasant Agricultural Production," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(1), pages 131-145, March.
    27. Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, 2008. "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 981-1022, December.
    28. Daniel Mejía & Pascual Restrepo & Sandra V. Rozo, 2017. "On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 31(2), pages 570-594.
    29. repec:eee:jhecon:v:54:y:2017:i:c:p:147-160 is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Hanan G. Jacoby & Bart Minten, 2007. "Is Land Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa Cost-Effective? Evidence from Madagascar," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 21(3), pages 461-485, June.
    31. Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross‐Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
    32. Moreno-Sanchez, Rocio & Kraybill, David S. & Thompson, Stanley R., 2003. "An Econometric Analysis of Coca Eradication Policy in Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 375-383, February.
    33. Gershon Feder & Tongroj Onchan, 1987. "Land Ownership Security and Farm Investment in Thailand," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(2), pages 311-320.
    34. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    35. Catherine Hafer, 2006. "On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 119-143.
    36. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators," MPRA Paper 23118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    37. Daniel Mejía & Pascual Restrepo, 2008. "The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia," Documentos CEDE 005123, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.
    38. Erica Field, 2007. "Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1561-1602.
    39. Brasselle, Anne-Sophie & Gaspart, Frederic & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2002. "Land tenure security and investment incentives: puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 373-418, April.
    40. Feder, Gershon & Feeny, David, 1991. "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 5(1), pages 135-153, January.
    41. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:103:y:2018:i:c:p:268-283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.