The War on Illegal Drug Production and Trafficking: An Economic Evaluation of Plan Colombia
This paper provides a thorough economic evaluation of the anti-drug policies implemented in Colombia between 2000 and 2006 under the so-called Plan Colombia. The paper develops a game theory model of the war against illegal drugs in producer countries. We explicitly model illegal drug markets, which allows us to account for the feedback effects between policies and market outcomes that are potentially important when evaluating large scale policy interventions such as Plan Colombia. We use available data for the war on cocaine production and trafficking as well as outcomes from the cocaine markets to calibrate the parameters of the model. Using the results from the calibration we estimate important measures of the costs, effectiveness, and efficiency of the war on drugs in Colombia. Finally we carry out simulations in order to assess the impact of increases in the U.S. budget allocated to Plan Colombia, and find that a three-fold increase in the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia would decrease the amount of cocaine that succesfully reaches consumer countries by about 17%.
|Date of creation:||02 Oct 2008|
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- Daniel Mejía, 2008.
"The War on Illegal Drugs in Producer and Consumer Countries: A Simple Analytical Framework,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2459, CESifo Group Munich.
- Daniel Mejia & Pascual Restrepo, 2011. "The War on Illegal Drugs in Producer and Consumer Countries: A simple analytical framework," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 007960, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
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- Herschel Grossman & Daniel Mejía, 2008. "The war against drug producers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-23, January.
- Herschel I. Grossman & Daniel Mejia, 2005. "The War Against Drug Producers," NBER Working Papers 11141, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Gernot Tragler & Jonathan P. Caulkins & Gustav Feichtinger, 2001. "Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Treatment and Enforcement in Illicit Drug Control," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 49(3), pages 352-362, June.
- Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Hao, Haijing, 2008. "Modelling drug market supply disruptions: Where do all the drugs not go?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 251-270. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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