IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/oropre/v49y2001i3p352-362.html

Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Treatment and Enforcement in Illicit Drug Control

Author

Listed:
  • Gernot Tragler

    (Vienna University of Technology, Department of Operations Research and Systems Theory, Argentinierstrasse 8/1192, A-1040, Vienna, Austria)

  • Jonathan P. Caulkins

    (Carnegie Mellon University, H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management; and RAND, 201 North Craig St., Suite 102, Pittsburgh, PA 15213)

  • Gustav Feichtinger

    (Vienna University of Technology, Department of Operations Research and Systems Theory, Argentinierstrasse 8/1192, A-1040, Vienna, Austria)

Abstract

There has been considerable debate about what share of drug control resources should be allocated to treatment vs. enforcement. Most of the debate has presumed that there is one answer to that question, but it seems plausible that the mix of interventions should vary as the size of the problem changes. We formulate the choice between treatment and enforcement as an optimal control problem and reach the following conclusions. If initiation into drug use is an increasing function of the current number of users and control begins early, then it is optimal to use very large amounts of both enforcement and treatment to cut short the epidemic. Otherwise the optimal policy is not to stop the growth of the epidemic, but rather to moderate it. Initially this should be done primarily with enforcement. Over time, enforcement spending should increase, but not nearly so fast as treatment spending. Hence, treatment should receive a larger share of control resources when a drug problem is mature than when it is first growing. If initiation rates subsequently decline, enforcement's budget share should drop further in the ensuing declining stage of the epidemic.

Suggested Citation

  • Gernot Tragler & Jonathan P. Caulkins & Gustav Feichtinger, 2001. "Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Treatment and Enforcement in Illicit Drug Control," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 49(3), pages 352-362, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:352-362
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.49.3.352.11215
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.3.352.11215
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/opre.49.3.352.11215?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. W. Davis Dechert & Kazuo Nishimura, 2012. "A Complete Characterization of Optimal Growth Paths in an Aggregated Model with a Non-Concave Production Function," Springer Books, in: John Stachurski & Alain Venditti & Makoto Yano (ed.), Nonlinear Dynamics in Equilibrium Models, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 237-257, Springer.
    2. Becker, Gary S & Grossman, Michael & Murphy, Kevin M, 1994. "An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 396-418, June.
    3. C. Peter Rydell & Jonathan P. Caulkins & Susan S. Everingham, 1996. "Enforcement or Treatment? Modeling the Relative Efficacy of Alternatives for Controlling Cocaine," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(5), pages 687-695, October.
    4. Moore, Mark H, 1973. "Policies to Achieve Discrimination on the Effective Price of Heroin," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 270-277, May.
    5. Baveja, Alok & Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Liu, Wensheng & Batta, Rajan & Karwan, Mark H., 1997. "When haste makes sense: Cracking down on street markets for illicit drugs," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 293-306, December.
    6. Saffer, Henry & Chaloupka, Frank, 1999. "The Demand for Illicit Drugs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(3), pages 401-411, July.
    7. Hartl, Richard F., 1987. "A simple proof of the monotonicity of the state trajectories in autonomous control problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 211-215, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Piccoli, Luca & Tiezzi, Silvia, 2021. "Rational addiction and time-consistency: An empirical test," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Conover, Emily & Scrimgeour, Dean, 2013. "Health consequences of easier access to alcohol: New Zealand evidence," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 570-585.
    3. Badi H. Baltagi & Ingo Geishecker, 2006. "Rational alcohol addiction: evidence from the Russian longitudinal monitoring survey," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(9), pages 893-914, September.
    4. Zeiler, I. & Caulkins, J.P. & Tragler, G., 2011. "Optimal control of interacting systems with DNSS property: The case of illicit drug use," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 60-73.
    5. Andrew M. Jones & Audrey Laporte & Nigel Rice & Eugenio Zucchelli, 2019. "Dynamic panel data estimation of an integrated Grossman and Becker–Murphy model of health and addiction," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 703-733, February.
    6. Liu, Jin-Long & Liu, Jin-Tan & Hammitt, James K. & Chou, Shin-Yi, 1999. "The price elasticity of opium in Taiwan, 1914-1942," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 795-810, December.
    7. Anne Bretteville-Jensen, 2006. "Drug Demand – Initiation, Continuation and Quitting," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(4), pages 491-516, December.
    8. Seidl, Andrea & Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Hartl, Richard F. & Kort, Peter M., 2018. "Serious strategy for the makers of fun: Analyzing the option to switch from pay-to-play to free-to-play in a two-stage optimal control model with quadratic costs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 267(2), pages 700-715.
    9. Ziggy MacDonald, 2004. "What Price Drug Use? The Contribution of Economics to an Evidence‐Based Drugs Policy," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 113-152, April.
    10. Andrew Jones & Audrey Laporte & Nigel Rice & Eugenio Zucchelli, 2014. "A Synthesis of the Grossman and Becker-Murphy Models of Health and Addiction: Theoretical and Empirical Implications," Working Papers 140007, Canadian Centre for Health Economics.
    11. Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Reuter, Peter, 2006. "Illicit drug markets and economic irregularities," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-14, March.
    12. Dave, Dhaval, 2006. "The effects of cocaine and heroin price on drug-related emergency department visits," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-333, March.
    13. van Ours, Jan C., 2003. "Is cannabis a stepping-stone for cocaine?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 539-554, July.
    14. Gerald Kennally, 2001. "Regulating the Trade in Recreational Drugs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 69-82, January.
    15. Pierani, P.; Tiezzi, S.;, 2017. "Rational addiction and time consistency:an empirical test," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 17/05, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
    16. I. Zeiler & J.P. Caulkins & G. Tragler, 2011. "Optimal Control of Interacting Systems with DNSS Property: The Case of Illicit Drug Use," Post-Print hal-00978258, HAL.
    17. Levy, Amnon, 2008. "A theory of entrenched socioeconomic deprivation and addiction to strong mind-altering substances," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 1756-1767, October.
    18. Skott, Peter & Thorlund Jepsen, Gunnar, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of drug policy in a model with imperfect competition and switching costs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 335-354, August.
    19. Mejia, Daniel & Restrepo, Pascual, 2016. "The economics of the war on illegal drug production and trafficking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 255-275.
    20. Andrew M. Jones & José M. Labeaga, 2003. "Individual heterogeneity and censoring in panel data estimates of tobacco expenditure," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 157-177.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:49:y:2001:i:3:p:352-362. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.