L’Étranger: Status, Property Rights, and Investment Incentives in Côte d’Ivoire
his study uses data from Côte d’Ivoire to show that "outsider" households have relatively small land holdings and less complete rights over land than locals. It then demonstrates a link between property rights and investment incentives by looking at the decision to leave land fallow. "Outsiders" fallow a smaller proportion of their land, indicating that their farms are left uncultivated for shorter periods. This is only partly explained by their incomplete property rights and relative land-poverty. These differences in investment patterns lead to lower yields per hectare.
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