Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy
This article explores the nature of property rights systems, their evolution, and their effect on resource allocation. It is argued that certain institutional arrangements of land rights have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency in credit as well as in land markets. Of particular relevance to developing countries, the article emphasizes the contribution of public sector infrastructure to effective land rights systems. An appendix to the article presents a formal model analyzing the effects of security of land rights on land prices, the intensity of cultivation, and the use of credit. Empirical evidence from Thailand supports several of the propositions derived from the model. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 5 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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