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Seguridad democrática, presencia de la policía y conflicto en Colombia

Author

Listed:
  • Darwin Cortés
  • María del Rosario Franco
  • Laura Hincapié
  • Juan Vargas

Abstract

Resumen: Este artículo evalúa uno de los componentes fundamentales de la política más icónica del gobierno de à lvaro Uribe: la Seguridad Democrática. En particular, se evalúa el impacto sobre la intensidad del conflicto armado de los despliegues y refuerzos de policía en municipios con poca o nula presencia policial antes de agosto de 2002. Para ello se utiliza el estimador de diferencia en diferencias que compara el cambio en la dinámica del conflicto una vez se asignan los nuevos efectivos a los municipios receptores, relativo al cambio ocurrido simultáneamente en los municipios no receptores. Nuestros resultados sugieren que tanto los despliegues (instauración de inspecciones de policía en municipios que carecían de éstas) como los refuerzos (envío de nuevos efectivos a municipios con poca presencia policial previa) generan incrementos en el número de ataques guerrilleros. Por otro lado, también hay evidencia que en los casos en los que la asignación de efectivos policiales estuvo acompañada de la movilización de tropas del ejército el conflicto disminuyó en las areas afectadas, lo que sugiere que la coordinación de las fuerzas armadas resulta clave para el éxito de iniciativas regionales de seguridad.AbstractThis article assesses one of the fundamental components of the most iconic policy of the government of à lvaro Uribe: the Democratic Security. In particular we assess the impact on the intensity of the armed conflict, of police deployment and reinforces in municipalities with little of no police presence before August 2002. We use the di erence in di erences estimator to compare the change in a dynamics of the armed conflict after the allocation of new police forces in the receiving municipalities, relative to the simultaneous change in municipalities that did not receive police. Results suggest that both deployments and reinforces increase the number of guerrilla attacks. On the other hand there is evidence that in the cases in which the allocation of police forces was accompanied by the mobilization of army troops the intensity of the conflict decreased in the affected areas. This suggests that the coordination between armed state forces is key for the success of local security initiatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Darwin Cortés & María del Rosario Franco & Laura Hincapié & Juan Vargas, 2011. "Seguridad democrática, presencia de la policía y conflicto en Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo 009136, Universidad del Rosario.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:009136
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Theorizing about conflict," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 165-189, Elsevier.
    3. Jorge Restrepo & Michael Spagat & Juan Vargas, 2004. "The Dynamics of the Columbian Civil Conflict: A New Dataset," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 396-429.
    4. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1, 00.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gerson Javier Perez, 2012. "Primera versión de la política de seguridad democrática: se cumplieron los objetivos?," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, December.
    2. Gerson Javier Pérez Valbuena, 2014. "La política de seguridad democrática 2002-2006: efectos socioeconómicos en las áreas rurales," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 16(30), pages 241-270, January-J.
    3. Juan Carlos Muñoz-Mora & Santiago Tobón-Zapata & Jesse d'Anjou, 2014. "Does land titling matter? The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops in Colombia," HiCN Working Papers 168, Households in Conflict Network.
    4. Morales, Juan S., 2021. "Legislating during war: Conflict and politics in Colombia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    5. Muñoz-Mora, Juan Carlos & Tobón, Santiago & d’Anjou, Jesse Willem, 2018. "The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops: Evidence from Colombia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 268-283.
    6. Martínez, Luis R., 2017. "Transnational insurgents: Evidence from Colombia's FARC at the border with Chávez's Venezuela," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 138-153.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Seguridad democrática; despliegues y refuerzos de policía; conflicto; Colombia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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