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Long-term effects of alternative deterrence policies: Panel data evidence from traffic punishments in Denmark

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  • Abay, Kibrom A.
  • Kahsay, Goytom Abraha

Abstract

This paper aims to quantify the long-term effects of alternative traffic punishments, ranging from demerit point assignment to conditional suspension of driving privileges. We employ unique longitudinal traffic offense data and exploit the introduction of a point-recording scheme in Denmark. We find that drivers who are assigned one or more demerit points reduce their frequency of traffic offenses and that these effects increase with the number of demerit points accumulated. However, these effects are short-lived, lasting only for the first two years post-reform and fading thereafter. In contrast, a stricter traffic punishment that conditionally suspends the driving license seems to have significant short-run and long-run effects. Our investigation into the types of offenses suggests that the deterrence effects are specific to the offense type for which they are imposed rather than generic improvements in driving behavior. These results imply that the effects of some of the existing traffic punishments are not only short-lived but also provide “specific deterrence”.

Suggested Citation

  • Abay, Kibrom A. & Kahsay, Goytom Abraha, 2018. "Long-term effects of alternative deterrence policies: Panel data evidence from traffic punishments in Denmark," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 1-19.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:transa:v:113:y:2018:i:c:p:1-19
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2018.03.029
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    3. Vito Bobek & Ivana Civsa & Tatjana Horvat, 2022. "Do Only Higher Penalties Help To Achieve Compliance In Selected Emerging Markets?," Economic Thought and Practice, Department of Economics and Business, University of Dubrovnik, vol. 31(2), pages 369-396, december.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deterrence policy; Traffic punishments; Driving behavior; Demerit points; Short-term and long-term effects; Generic and specific deterrence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy

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