Point-record driving licence and road safety : an economic approach
Point-record driving licences are widely used nowadays to enforce road legislations, but with diverse implementations from one country to the other, and even within a country. As any non-monetary sanction, depriving offenders from their licences allows the Government to incapacitate dangerous individuals and also to deter normal drivers to infringe road legislation. We investigate the desirable features of point-record licence mechanisms, and in particular, if they should allow drivers to redeem their points and/or include probationary periods. We also consider the possibility of an immediate withdrawal of the driving licence for very serious offences.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 2007, 91 (1-2), pp.235-258|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00243024|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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