Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data
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- Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2009. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," Working Papers hal-00414479, HAL.
- Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Maurice Mathieu, 2011. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," Post-Print hal-00567866, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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01-05, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
- G. Dionne & M. Maurice & J. Pinquet & C. Vanasse, 2001. "The Role of Memory in Long-Term Contracting with Moral Hazard : Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance," THEMA Working Papers 2001-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche 1233, CIRPEE.
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- Peng Shi & Wei Zhang, 2016. "A Test of Asymmetric Learning in Competitive Insurance With Partial Information Sharing," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(3), pages 557-578, September.
- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
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- Dionne, Georges & Liu, Ying, 2017. "Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China," Working Papers 17-1, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Heni Boubaker & Nadia Sghaier, 2014. "How Do the Interest Rate and the Inflation Rate Affect the Non-Life Insurance Premiums ?," Working Papers 2014-282, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
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- Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
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