Health Insurance, Treatment and Outcomes: Using Auto Accidents as Health Shocks
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HEA-2005-02-13 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2005-02-13 (Insurance Economics)
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