Health Insurance, Treatment and Outcomes: Using Auto Accidents as Health Shocks
Previous studies find that the uninsured receive less health care than the insured, yet differences in health outcomes have rarely been studied. In addition, selection bias may partly explain the difference in care received. This paper focuses on an unexpected health shock -- severe automobile accidents where victims have little choice but to visit a hospital. Another innovation is the use of a comparison group that is similar to the uninsured: those who have private health insurance but do not have automobile insurance. The medically uninsured are found to receive twenty percent less care and have a substantially higher mortality rate.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Doyle Jr., Joseph J. "Health Insurance, Treatment, and Outcomes: Using Auto Accidents as Health Shocks." Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 2 (May 2005): 256-270.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000.
"Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 1997. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Working Papers 97-11, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 2001.
"Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 249-62, Summer.
- Elaine Silverman & Jonathan Skinner, 2001. "Are For-Profit Hospitals Really Different? Medicare Upcoding and Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jullien, B. & Salanie, B. & Salanie, F., 1998.
"Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?,"
98.489, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Janet Currie & Jonathan Gruber, 1997. "The Technology of Birth: Health Insurance, Medical Interventions, and Infant Health," NBER Working Papers 5985, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
- Frank A. Sloan & Gabriel A. Picone & Donald H. Taylor, Jr. & Shin-Yi Chou, 1999.
"Does Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? An Analysis of Medicare Data,"
NBER Working Papers
6896, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frank A. Sloan & Gabriel A. Picone & Donald H. Taylor, Jr. & Shin-Yi Chou, 1999. "Does Where You Are Admitted Make a Difference? An Analysis of Medicare Data," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, volume 2, pages 1-26 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Currie, J. & Thomas, D., 1995.
"Medical Care for Children, Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and Racial Differences in Utilization,"
95-08, RAND - Reprint Series.
- Janet Currie & Duncan Thomas, 1995. "Medical Care for Children: Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and Racial Differences in Utilization," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 30(1), pages 135-162.
- Mark G. Duggan, 2000.
"Hospital Ownership And Public Medical Spending,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1343-1373, November.
- Long, Stephen H. & Marquis, M. Susan & Rodgers, Jack, 1998. "Do people shift their use of health services over time to take advantage of insurance?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 105-115, January.
- Edward C. Norton & Douglas O. Staiger, 1994. "How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to Care for the Uninsured," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 171-185, Spring.
- Dionne, Georges & St-Michel, Pierre, 1991.
"Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 236-44, May.
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation and Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P., 1988. "Workers' Compensation And Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 8831, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Heckman, James J. & Lalonde, Robert J. & Smith, Jeffrey A., 1999. "The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1865-2097 Elsevier.
- Fortin, Bernard & Lanoie, Paul, 1992. "Substitution between unemployment insurance and workers' compensation : An analysis applied to the risk of workplace accidents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 287-312, December.
- Manning, Willard G., 1998. "The logged dependent variable, heteroscedasticity, and the retransformation problem," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 283-295, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11099. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.