Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data
Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote safe driving. Examples of mechanisms are fines, experience rating and point-record driving licenses. We analyse the effectiveness of these mechanisms in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time and accumulated demerit points. These properties are tested empirically with data from the Quebec public insurance plan. We find evidence of moral hazard, which means that drivers who accumulate demerit points become more careful because they are at threat of losing their license. The insurance rating scheme introduced in 1992 reduced the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. We use this result to derive monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2011, 93 (1), pp.218-227|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00567866|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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