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Point-record driving licence and road safety: An economic approach

  • Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
  • Picard, Pierre

Les permis de conduire à points sont aujourd'hui très largement utilisés pour faire respecter les politiques de sécurité routière, avec toutefois des mises en oeuvre diverses selon les pays et parfois à l'intérieur d'un même pays. Comme toute sanction non-monétaire, priver les contrevenants de leur permis permet aux autorités publiques de retirer de la route les individus dangereux et aussi de dissuader les conducteurs normaux d'enfreindre le code de la route. Nous analysons les caractéristiques souhaitables des mécanismes de permis à points et, en particulier, nous étudions s'ils devraient inclure des clauses de récupération des points perdus et des périodes probatoires. Nous envisageons également la possibilité d'un retrait immédiat du permis de conduire pour les infractions les plus graves.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 91 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (February)
Pages: 235-258

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:1-2:p:235-258
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