IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Game Theoretical Approach to Road Safety

  • Pål Andreas Pedersen

    ()

Registered author(s):

    A theoretical model is adopted in order to explain incentives and actual safety behaviour for drivers, pedestrians and other road users which do not utilise motorised vehicles. A road user's outcome is supposed to be dependent on her individual actions and cares decided upon by other individuals utilising the roads simultaneously, as well as on external traffic safety conditions. By varying the types of road users meeting in traffic and the order of moves taken, several different games are identified, analysed and compared. In addition to focussing on the possible strategic interactions between the road users and the outcomes most likely to be found in different situations, we discuss the existence and size of moral hazard effects caused by improvements in external safety conditions.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: ftp://ftp.ukc.ac.uk/pub/ejr/RePEc/ukc/ukcedp/0105.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by School of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0105.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: Mar 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0105
    Contact details of provider: Postal: School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
    Phone: +44 (0)1227 827497
    Web page: http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/

    Order Information: Email:


    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Dickerson, Andrew & Peirson, John & Vickerman, Roger, 2000. "Road Accidents and Traffic Flows: An Econometric Investigation," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(265), pages 101-21, February.
    2. Risa, Alf Erling, 1992. "Public Regulation of Private Accident Risk: The Moral Hazard of Technological Improvements," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 335-46, December.
    3. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-53, October.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    5. John Peirson & Ian Skinner & Roger Vickerman, 1996. "The Microeconomic Analysis of the External Costs of Road Accidents," Studies in Economics 9606, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    6. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
    7. Boyer, M. & Dionne, G., 1985. "The Economics of Road Safety," Cahiers de recherche 8554, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0105. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tracey Girling)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.