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A copula approach to test asymmetric information with applications to predictive modeling

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  • Shi, Peng
  • Valdez, Emiliano A.

Abstract

In this article, we present a copula regression model for testing asymmetric information as well as for predictive modeling applications in automobile insurance market. We use the Frank copula to jointly model the type of coverage and the number of accidents, with the dependence parameter providing for evidence of the relationship between the choice of coverage and the frequency of accidents. This dependence therefore provides an indication of the presence (or absence) of asymmetric information. The type of coverage is in some sense ordered so that coverage with higher ordinals indicate the most comprehensive coverage. Henceforth, a positive relationship would indicate that more coverage is chosen by high risk policyholders, and vice versa. This presence of asymmetric information could be due to either adverse selection or moral hazard, a distinction often made in the economics or insurance literature, or both. We calibrated our copula model using a one-year cross-sectional observation of claims arising from a major automobile insurer in Singapore. Our estimation results indicate a significant positive coverage-risk relationship. However, when we correct for the bias resulting from possible underreporting of accidents, we find that the positive association vanishes. We further used our estimated model for other possible actuarial applications. In particular, we are able to demonstrate the effect of coverage choice on the incidence of accidents, and based on which, the pure premium is derived. In general, a positive margin is observed when compared with the gross premium available in our empirical database.

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  • Shi, Peng & Valdez, Emiliano A., 2011. "A copula approach to test asymmetric information with applications to predictive modeling," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 226-239, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:49:y:2011:i:2:p:226-239
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    Cited by:

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    3. Imen Karaa, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Learning in the Tunisian Automobile Insurance Market: New Evidence from Dynamic Data," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(3), pages 560-589, July.
    4. Noureddine Benlagha & Imen Karaa, 2017. "Evidence of adverse selection in automobile insurance market: A seemingly unrelated probit modelling," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 1330303-133, January.
    5. Safari-Katesari Hadi & Zaroudi Samira, 2020. "Count copula regression model using generalized beta distribution of the second kind," Statistics in Transition New Series, Polish Statistical Association, vol. 21(2), pages 1-12, June.
    6. Zhao, Xiaobing & Zhou, Xian, 2012. "Copula models for insurance claim numbers with excess zeros and time-dependence," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 191-199.
    7. Hadi Safari-Katesari & Samira Zaroudi, 2020. "Count copula regression model using generalized beta distribution of the second kind," Statistics in Transition New Series, Polish Statistical Association, vol. 21(2), pages 1-12, June.

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