IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Quit behavior and the role of job protection

  • Gielen, Anne C.
  • Tatsiramos, Konstantinos

Job protection reduces job turnover by changing firms' hiring and firing decisions. Yet the effect of job protection on workers' quit decisions and post-quit outcomes is still unknown. We present the first evidence using individual panel data from 12 European countries, which differ both in worker turnover rates and in the level of job protection. We find that workers are less likely to quit their job in countries with more job protection, and those workers who quit receive higher wages compared to stayers. This evidence can be explained by increased mobility costs associated with higher expected risk of post-quit layoff and job mismatch.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537112000450
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Labour Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 624-632

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:4:p:624-632
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Adriana Kugler & Giovanni Pica, 2005. "Effects of Employment Protection on Worker and Job Flows: Evidence from the 1990 Italian Reform," NBER Working Papers 11658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Bertola, Giuseppe & Rogerson, Richard, 1997. "Institutions and labor reallocation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1147-1171, June.
  3. Clark, Andrew E., 2001. "What really matters in a job? Hedonic measurement using quit data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 223-242, May.
  4. Katharine G. Abraham & Susan N. Houseman, 1994. "Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility? Lessons from Germany, France, and Belgium," Book chapters authored by Upjohn Institute researchers, in: Rebecca M. Blank (ed.), Social Protection Versus Economic Flexibility: Is There a Trade-off?, pages 59-93 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  5. Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2003. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search : theory and evidence," Research Unit Working Papers 0212, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
  6. Messina, Julián & Vallanti, Giovanna, 2006. "Job flow dynamics and firing restrictions: evidence from Europe," Working Paper Series 0602, European Central Bank.
  7. Helen Connolly & Peter Gottschalk, 2008. "Wage Cuts as Investment in Future Wage Growth," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 22(1), pages 1-22, 03.
  8. Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Job security, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 851-879, June.
  9. Garibaldi, Pietro, 1998. "Job flow dynamics and firing restrictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 245-275, February.
  10. Clark, Andrew E & Postel-Vinay, Fabien, 2005. "Job Security and Job Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 4927, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. John Haltiwanger & Stefano Scarpetta & Helena Schweiger, 2008. "Assessing Job Flows Across Countries: The Role of Industry, Firm Size and Regulations," NBER Working Papers 13920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Tito Boeri & Juan F. Jimeno, . "The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from Variable Enforcement," Working Papers 2003-12, FEDEA.
  13. Winfried Koeniger & Marco Leonardi & Luca Nunziata, 2007. "Labor Market Institutions and Wage Inequality," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(3), pages 340-356, April.
  14. Pfann, Gerard A., 2001. "Options to quit," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 259-265, February.
  15. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher A, 1999. "Unemployment Responses to 'Skill-Biased' Technology Shocks: The Role of Labour Market Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 242-65, April.
  16. Freeman, Richard B, 1978. "Job Satisfaction as an Economic Variable," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 135-41, May.
  17. Gielen, Anne C. & Tatsiramos, Konstantinos, 2012. "Quit behavior and the role of job protection," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 624-632.
  18. Andrew Clark & Yannis Georgellis & Peter Sanfey, . "Job Satisfaction, Wage changes and Quits: Evidence from Germany," Economics and Finance Discussion Papers 98-06, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
  19. Garcia Perez, Jose Ignacio & Rebollo Sanz, Yolanda, 2005. "Wage changes through job mobility in Europe: A multinomial endogenous switching approach," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 531-555, August.
  20. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-90, October.
  21. Nickell, S J, 1978. "Fixed Costs, Employment and Labour Demand over the Cycle," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 45(180), pages 329-45, November.
  22. Micco, Alejandro & Pagés, Carmen, 2006. "The Economic Effects of Employment Protection: Evidence from International Industry-Level Data," IZA Discussion Papers 2433, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  23. Elisabetta Trevisan, 2008. "Enforcement of Employment Protection and the hiring behaviour of firms. Evidence from a large Italian region," Working Papers 2008_25, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  24. Schivardi, Fabiano & Torrini, Roberto, 2005. "Identifying the Effects of Firing Restrictions Through Size-Contingent Differences in Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Thomas Bauer & Uwe Sunde & Holger Bonin, 2004. "Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in Small Establishments," RWI Discussion Papers 0012, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
  26. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-73, May.
  27. Gomez-Salvador, Ramon & Messina, Julian & Vallanti, Giovanna, 2004. "Gross job flows and institutions in Europe," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 469-485, August.
  28. Gielen, A. C., 2008. "Age-specific labor market dynamics," Other publications TiSEM 41484a8c-ba6a-4bcc-bcbf-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  29. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "The Distribution of Earnings in an Equilibrium Search Model with State-Dependent Offers and Counteroffers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(4), pages 989-1016, November.
  30. Bentolila, Samuel & Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad Is Eurosclerosis?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 381-402, July.
  31. Kahn, Lawrence M., 2010. "Employment protection reforms, employment and the incidence of temporary jobs in Europe: 1996-2001," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-15, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:4:p:624-632. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.