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Employment Protection, Job Insecurity, and Job Mobility

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This study leverages the Italian Jobs Act reform as a natural experiment to examine the impact of reduced employment protection on job insecurity and job mobility. The reform significantly lowered protection for open-ended contract workers in large firms hired after March 7, 2015, and introduced a sharp discontinuity in severance pay at 2-year tenure. Treated employees exhibit increased fear of job loss and higher termination rates. The higher job insecurity prompts workers in low-pay sectors and in low-quality firms to actively pursue job mobility, transitioning towards higher-paying positions. Conversely, workers in high-paying sectors respond by intensifying their efforts to secure their existing jobs. Crucially, all effects disappear for workers above the 2-year tenure threshold, when they become entitled to a 50% higher severance pay. These findings emphasize a complex trade-off behind the design of employment protection systems, as addressing early-stage insecurity with tailored social insurance may counteract upward mobility effects.

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  • Marco Bertoni & Simone Chinetti & Roberto Nisticò, 2023. "Employment Protection, Job Insecurity, and Job Mobility," CSEF Working Papers 684, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:684
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    employment protection; job insecurity; job mobility; on-the-job search.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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