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Contagious synchronization and endogenous network formation in financial networks

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  • Aymanns, Christoph
  • Georg, Co-Pierre

Abstract

When banks choose similar investment strategies the financial system becomes vulnerable to common shocks. We model a simple financial system in which banks decide about their investment strategy based on a private belief about the state of the world and a social belief formed from observing the actions of peers. Observing a larger group of peers conveys more information and thus leads to a stronger social belief. Extending the standard model of Bayesian updating in social networks, we show that the probability that banks synchronize their investment strategy on a state non-matching action critically depends on the weighting between private and social belief. This effect is alleviated when banks choose their peers endogenously in a network formation process, internalizing the externalities arising from social learning.

Suggested Citation

  • Aymanns, Christoph & Georg, Co-Pierre, 2015. "Contagious synchronization and endogenous network formation in financial networks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 273-285.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:50:y:2015:i:c:p:273-285
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.06.030
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    2. Naji Massad & Jørgen Vitting Andersen, 2017. "Three different ways synchronization can cause contagion in financial markets," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17059, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    3. Carlos León, 2020. "Banks in Colombia: How Homogeneous Are They?," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, vol. 23(2), pages 1-32.
    4. Naji Massad & Jørgen Vitting Andersen, 2018. "Three Different Ways Synchronization Can Cause Contagion in Financial Markets," Post-Print hal-01951164, HAL.
    5. Naji Massad & J{o}rgen Vitting Andersen, 2019. "Three Different Ways Synchronization Can Cause Contagion in Financial Markets," Papers 1902.10800, arXiv.org.
    6. Hüser, Anne-Caroline, 2016. "Too interconnected to fail: A survey of the Interbank Networks literature," SAFE Working Paper Series 91, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2016.
    7. Naji Massad & Jørgen Vitting Andersen, 2017. "Three different ways synchronization can cause contagion in financial markets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01673333, HAL.
    8. Naji Massad & Jørgen Vitting Andersen, 2017. "Three different ways synchronization can cause contagion in financial markets," Post-Print halshs-01673333, HAL.
    9. Roy Cerqueti & Francesca Pampurini & Annagiulia Pezzola & Anna Grazia Quaranta, 2022. "Dangerous liasons and hot customers for banks," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 65-89, July.
    10. Naji Massad & Jørgen Vitting Andersen, 2018. "Three Different Ways Synchronization Can Cause Contagion in Financial Markets," Risks, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-13, September.
    11. Naji Massad & Jørgen Vitting Andersen, 2018. "Three Different Ways Synchronization Can Cause Contagion in Financial Markets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01951164, HAL.
    12. Hałaj, Grzegorz & Peltonen, Tuomas A. & Scheicher, Martin, 2018. "How did the Greek credit event impact the credit default swap market?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 136-158.
    13. Jiajia, Liu & Kun, Guo & Fangcheng, Tang & Yahan, Wang & Shouyang, Wang, 2023. "The effect of the disposal of non-performing loans on interbank liquidity risk in China: A cash flow network-based analysis," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 105-119.
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    16. Li, Shouwei & Sui, Xin, 2016. "Contagion risk in endogenous financial networks," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 591-597.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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