Leverage-induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies
We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies. The first is the unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum leverage. The second is Basle II and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options. When compared to the unregulated case both Basle II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high. This is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which can destabilize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: Risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with low maximum leverage, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage. No one prefers Basle II.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- LeBaron Blake & Winker Peter, 2008. "Introduction to the Special Issue on Agent-Based Models for Economic Policy Advice," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 228(2-3), pages 141-148, April.
- Stefan Kerbl, 2010.
"Regulatory Medicine Against Financial Market Instability: What Helps And What Hurts?,"
1011.6284, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2010.
- Stefan Kerbl, 2011. "Regulatory Medicine Against Financial Market Instability: What Helps And What Hurts?," Working Papers 174, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).