IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Inside Money, Procyclical Leverage, and Banking Catastrophes

  • Charles D. Brummitt
  • Rajiv Sethi
  • Duncan J. Watts

We explore a model of the interaction between banks and outside investors in which the ability of banks to issue inside money (short-term liabilities believed to be convertible into currency at par) can generate a collapse in asset prices and widespread bank insolvency. The banks and investors share a common belief about the future value of certain long-term assets, but they have different objective functions; changes to this common belief result in portfolio adjustments and trade. Positive belief shocks induce banks to buy risky assets from investors, and the banks finance those purchases by issuing new short-term liabilities. Negative belief shocks induce banks to sell assets in order to reduce their chance of insolvency to a tolerably low level, and they supply more assets at lower prices, which can result in multiple market-clearing prices. A sufficiently severe negative shock causes the set of equilibrium prices to contract (in a manner given by a cusp catastrophe), causing prices to plummet discontinuously and banks to become insolvent. Successive positive and negative shocks of equal magnitude do not cancel; rather, a banking catastrophe can occur even if beliefs simply return to their initial state. Capital requirements can prevent crises by curtailing the expansion of balance sheets when beliefs become more optimistic, but they can also force larger price declines. Emergency asset price supports can be understood as attempts by a central bank to coordinate expectations on an equilibrium with solvency.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1403.1637
File Function: Latest version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by arXiv.org in its series Papers with number 1403.1637.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2014
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in PLoS ONE 9(8): e104219
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1403.1637
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://arxiv.org/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Fabio Caccioli & Munik Shrestha & Cristopher Moore & J. Doyne Farmer, 2012. "Stability analysis of financial contagion due to overlapping portfolios," Papers 1210.5987, arXiv.org.
  2. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
  3. Philip Lowe & Claudio Borio, 2002. "Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus," BIS Working Papers 114, Bank for International Settlements.
  4. Kartik Anand & Prasanna Gai & Matteo Marsili, 2011. "Rollover risk, network structure and systemic financial crises," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-052, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  5. John Geanakoplos & Ana Fostel, 2008. "Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1211-44, September.
  6. Gai, Prasanna & Kapadia, Sujit, 2010. "Contagion in financial networks," Bank of England working papers 383, Bank of England.
  7. Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, 2013. "Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(6), pages 2549-2587, December.
  8. Guillermo Ordonez & Gary Gorton, 2011. "Collateral Crises," 2011 Meeting Papers 569, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno M & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2000. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 611-38, August.
  10. Bianchi, Javier, 2009. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," MPRA Paper 16270, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Guido Lorenzoni, 2008. "Inefficient Credit Booms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 809-833.
  12. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2009. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2201-2238, June.
  13. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  14. Gennotte, Gerard & Leland, Hayne, 1990. "Market Liquidity, Hedging, and Crashes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 999-1021, December.
  15. John Geanakoplos, 2010. "The Leverage Cycle," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 1-65 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Gorton, Gary B., 2012. "Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See Them Coming," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199922901, March.
  17. Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Risk and Liquidity," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199546367, March.
  18. Battiston, Stefano & Gatti, Domenico Delli & Gallegati, Mauro & Greenwald, Bruce & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2012. "Default cascades: When does risk diversification increase stability?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 138-149.
  19. Nier, Erlend & Yang, Jing & Yorulmazer, Tanju & Alentorn, Amadeo, 2007. "Network models and financial stability," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 2033-2060, June.
  20. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Stefan Nagel & Dmitry Orlov, 2012. "Sizing Up Repo," NBER Working Papers 17768, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Arvind Krishnamurthy & Stefan Nagel & Dmitry Orlov, 2014. "Sizing Up Repo," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2381-2417, December.
  21. Jon Danielsson & Hyun Song Shin & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, 2011. "Balance sheet capacity and endogenous risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 43141, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  22. John Geanakoplos, 2009. "The Leverage Cycle," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1715R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2010.
  23. Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, 2013. "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9929, April.
  24. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2008. "Information Contagion and Bank Herding," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 215-231, 02.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1403.1637. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (arXiv administrators)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.