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Regulatory Medicine Against Financial Market Instability: What Helps And What Hurts?

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  • Stefan Kerbl

Abstract

Do we know if a short selling ban or a Tobin Tax result in more stable asset prices? Or do they in fact make things worse? Just like medicine regulatory measures in financial markets aim at improving an already complex system. And just like medicine these interventions can cause side effects which are even harder to assess when taking the interplay with other measures into account. In this paper an agent based stock market model is built that tries to find answers to the questions above. In a stepwise procedure regulatory measures are introduced and their implications on market liquidity and stability examined. Particularly, the effects of (i) a ban of short selling (ii) a mandatory risk limit, i.e. a Value-at-Risk limit, (iii) an introduction of a Tobin Tax, i.e. transaction tax on trading, and (iv) any arbitrary combination of the measures are observed and discussed. The model is set up to incorporate non-linear feedback effects of leverage and liquidity constraints leading to fire sales and escape dynamics. In its unregulated version the model outcome is capable of reproducing stylised facts of asset returns like fat tails and clustered volatility. Introducing regulatory measures shows that only a mandatory risk limit is beneficial from every perspective, while a short selling ban - though reducing volatility - increases tail risk. The contrary holds true for a Tobin Tax: it reduces the occurrence of crashes but increases volatility. Furthermore, the interplay of measures is not negligible: measures block each other and a well chosen combination can mitigate unforeseen side effects. Concerning the Tobin Tax the findings indicate that an overdose can do severe harm.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Kerbl, 2010. "Regulatory Medicine Against Financial Market Instability: What Helps And What Hurts?," Papers 1011.6284, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1011.6284
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Poledna, Sebastian & Thurner, Stefan & Farmer, J. Doyne & Geanakoplos, John, 2014. "Leverage-induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 199-212.
    2. Sebastian Poledna & Stefan Thurner & J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos, 2013. "Leverage-induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies," Papers 1301.6114, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2014.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E37 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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