Climate game analyses for CO2 emission trading among various world organizations
This paper simulates the saving in terms of the total abatement cost of CO2 emission reductions for different trading games reflecting the potential cooperation among organizations including the European Union (EU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, the Union of South American Nations (USAN), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). A game approach is conducted to determine if the cooperation will come into existence among the organizations stated above. A similar idea is applied to the four largest emission countries, China, the United States, Russia, and India, as four individual players in the trading game.
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